Two responses to a moment in the question of transcendence: a study of first boundaries in Plotinean and Kabbalistic cosmogonical metaphysics by DeBord, Charles Eugene
 TWO RESPONSES TO A MOMENT IN THE QUESTION OF TRANSCENDENCE: 
A STUDY OF FIRST BOUNDARIES IN PLOTINEAN AND KABBALISTIC 
COSMOGONICAL METAPHYSICS 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
by 
CHARLES EUGENE DEBORD 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of  
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
 
May 2004 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Philosophy 
 TWO RESPONSES TO A MOMENT IN THE QUESTION OF TRANSCENDENCE: 
A STUDY OF FIRST BOUNDARIES IN PLOTINEAN AND KABBALISTIC 
COSMOGONICAL METAPHYSICS 
 
A Thesis 
by 
CHARLES EUGENE DEBORD 
 
Submitted to Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
Approved as to style and content by: 
 
___________________________     ___________________________ 
      Scott Austin          Theodore George 
          (Chair of Committee)                (Member) 
 
___________________________     ___________________________ 
   David G. Myers              Robin Smith 
        (Member)                 (Head of Department) 
 
May 2004 
Major Subject: Philosophy 
 iii
ABSTRACT 
 
Two Responses to a Moment in the Question of Transcendence: A Study of First 
Boundaries in Plotinean and Kabbalistic Cosmogonical Metaphysics.  (May 2004) 
Charles Eugene DeBord, B.A., Taylor University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Scott Austin 
 
This thesis contrasts the Plotinean attitude towards transcendence at the 
cosmological level with that of certain Kabbalistic authors of the 13th-17th century.  
Special emphasis is placed on the different approaches taken by each of the two sides to 
addressing the origin of otherness.  Following a brief introduction to the notion of the 
question of transcendence, the first major part (chapter II) is dedicated to an exploration 
of the Plotinean conception of metaphysical “descent” from the One to subsequent 
hypostases.  The second major part (chapter III) focuses on Kabbalistic conceptions of 
the descent from the indefinite infinite to the finite (limited) realm.  Finally, I attempt to 
illustrate the questions and concerns common to each of the two cosmologies.  In so 
doing, I make use of semiotic concepts to clarify the contrast between the two models.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: A CRISIS OF TRANSCENDENCE 
 That which is, is other.  This is to say that to be is to be something.  The 
implications of this notion are unrivaled in their scientific essentiality, for out of this 
foundation rise latent dichotomies definitive of worlds natural and supernatural.  In 
difference is language born, and out of otherness rises form.  Rational forming principles 
involve notions of the different, as definition is conceived through exclusion.  As the 
essential factors involved are compounded or reduced, the notion of the other evinces 
itself on a variety of fields and in a panoply of moments, each differentiated according to 
the context of its position. 
Of these moments of otherness, perhaps the most fundamentally recognizable is 
that divide separating “is” from “is not.”  This moment has variously been defined in 
terms of Same and Different, Being and Nonbeing, Presence and Absence.  Is/Is-not 
provides the scaffold for the traditional architectures of Time and Eternity, Space and 
Singularity, Individual and Community, and Self and Not-Self, to name a few.1  For 
itself this distinction is understood linguistically, and language is supposed as a 
cornerstone even for this critical diremption of that which is from that which is not.  
Ironically, however, language is itself a one-sided enterprise, for even the forms binding 
Is and Is-not may be unwritten in silent mystery.  In its nascent formation, writing is a  
_______________ 
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scratching, a tearing, but just as much is written when eyelids are torn open, much is 
mysterious when they are shut. 
Let us cleave to language for the present, and in so doing, let us isolate a moment 
of otherness on the cosmological level in the guise of an old form and its complement: 
on one side we are confronted with the form for perfection, that is, that which lacks 
nothing but is complete and total in its presentation of the idea.  Opposing perfection is, 
quite logically, imperfection.  Frequently throughout the history of philosophy has the 
story been told that the perfect is prior to the imperfect in some sense, be it logical, 
ontological, or chronological.  The imperfect is derived somehow from the perfect.   
We have, then, an axiom which details the priority of perfections.  Very 
reasonably, such an articulation of the dialectic of perfection and imperfection frequently 
entails the corollary notion that the perfect is unified in a manner in which the imperfect 
is not.  This secondary notion becomes evident on consideration of the relation of 
priority: if the imperfect comes after the perfect, and if the imperfect is derived from the 
perfect, entities are multiplied in the genesis of imperfection.  First, there is one – i.e. 
that which is perfect, and then there are two – perfect and imperfect.  From this it may be 
seen to follow that that which is utterly perfect is also utterly unified and therefore also 
first (i.e., there could be nothing that precedes that which contains/embodies every 
perfection). 
There is at this point a split in the tradition of the description of prime perfection.  
Under one model for conceptualization, the perfect One, embodying all perfections, 
must embody the perfection of Form.  As such, it is perfectly formed according to some 
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singular cosmic logos.  Another way of arriving at the conclusion that the One is formed 
is to note that, since the One is, and since to be entails otherness and therefore limit, the 
One must be defined by some rational principle.  This model will be reintroduced and 
specified later, but let it presently be termed the “finitist” view. 
Another conceptualization for prime perfection also begins with the notion of the 
One as the embodiment of all perfections.  However, whereas on the finitist view the 
perfection in focus was that of Form, here central concern shifts to the perfection of 
unity.  Thus the argument proceeds: the One is the embodiment of all perfections.  This 
entails that the One embodies the perfection of unity.  Consider, though, that to posit a 
finite (formed) nature of the One is to limit the One and so to distinguish it: in saying the 
One is according to this way, we imply that the One is not according to that way.  As 
was seen above, to form is to exclude, to distinguish, and so to imply a multiplicity in 
the notion of a thing considered for itself.  As such, this alternative model for 
conceptualization of the notion of prime perfection tends to speak of the One as 
“limitless” and “infinite.”  For now, I will call this model the “infinitist” view.2  It is 
with this latter view with which I will primarily concern myself here.   
The infinite is unified; the finite is multiplied.  In formation, a thing is limited, 
and this limitation entails the absence of some other thing.  Difference/diversity imply a 
variety of logoi, and in this implication the relation of limitation is compounded.  
Precision of form is directly proportional to the magnitude of the manifestation of 
otherness.  Above, Being was seen to be identifiable with Other.  Said another way, to be 
is to be diverse.  Multiplicity is therefore a prerequisite for existence, and ontological 
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distinction (particularization) opposes universality just insofar as the one is differentiated 
more exactly that the other: light is such that it is just light and not darkness; sunlight is 
such that it is just sunlight and not darkness and not firelight and not bioluminescence 
etc.  Ultimate unity, however, is amenable to no such definition and so comes not under 
the governance of the logic of Being, and we may say that absolute infinity (i.e. qua 
prime perfection) transcends existence as we understand it. 
 
The Boundary 
There is thus a boundary dividing (on the infinitist view, anyway) the indefinite 
infinite from limited finitude.  This boundary is a chasm: on one side stands those things 
amenable to linguistic forms (i.e. those things structured by rational principles) and on 
the other rests boundless perfection.  In one sense, then, it is false even to conceive of 
the infinite (i.e. the unlimited) as infinite for another; true infinity would subsume all 
otherness in its own complete notion.  In this sense, however, infinity is mistakenly 
supposed to participate in Being in the same sense as does the finite.  It is entirely 
meaningful to remark that if the present, rational side of the chasm is, then the irrational 
infinite is not.   
Axiomatic for the discussion, however, is the relation of the priority of perfect to 
imperfect.  As such, the question of transcendence presents itself on the cosmological 
level: how does the perfect get to the imperfect?  Said another way, how does that which 
transcends Being itself produce Being?  What constitutes the path across the chasm 
dividing One from Other?  This question requires a clear definition of the boundary 
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separating the two sides from one another, for the limit must be realized before it can be 
overcome.   
The domain of language operates between utter particularity and unqualified 
universality; lexical forms fail at both ends of the scientific spectrum in question.3  As 
such, the crisis of transcendence is a crisis of communication and a crisis of society.  
Understood thus, it becomes evident that the moment of transcendence, manifested as it 
may be on whatever field, constitutes the inception of dialectic logic, i.e. of dialogue.  At 
any point of pluralization, the immanent must affix itself to itself via some syntactical 
relation.  The moment of transcendence is the foundation of syntax, whether that syntax 
operates for the logic of metacosmic ontology, of selfhood, or of the individual’s relation 
to and within the community.  An understanding of this moment is therefore critical for 
comprehension of both sides together.   
This essay will be an analysis of two approaches to the crisis of transcendence.  It 
will be instructive to view each relative to its attitude to the moment of communication.  
First I will take up the metaphysics of Plotinus in an examination of his cosmogony 
relating nous to the One.  We will see that for Plotinus, the moment of communication is 
described as an act: communication (for him, the overflow of the One) is worked out as a 
predicate of the One and of Intellect.  By a two-way path the One socializes with its 
progeny.  The One proceeds as Intellect returns in an eternal dialectic.  These acts 
constitute the means by which immanence and transcendence are related.   
Second, I will examine some cosmological principles of what I will herein term 
“classical” Kabbalah, i.e. speculation belonging to certain Kabbalists of the thirteenth 
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through seventeenth centuries.  Under the emergent general metaphysical system of 
these sages, the moment of communication is conceived as subject rather than as 
predicate.  They posit an entity known as keter, the supreme crown of infinite God, as 
that which links God in his determinate aspects with His limitlessness.  This entity, 
hypostatic in its conception, is nevertheless always already two-dimensional, with one 
side of its activity directed toward the infinite as the other directs itself toward the finite.   
After having examined each approach to the crisis of transcendence, I will reflect 
briefly on the yield of each conception: how do the respective ideas of mediating and 
mediator impact understanding of the moment of communication?  Prime syntax may be 
seen both as substance and outworking, just as the sign-signified relation presumes both 
content and form.  I will thus attempt, without providing anything like a comprehensive 
linguistic philosophy, to view the two metaphysical solutions in something of a lexical 
context, a method which will, I believe, clarify both question and answer. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE TWO-WAY PATH 
What is the horizon which he will mount above when he appears?  He 
will be above Intellect itself which contemplates him.4
 
 Plotinus offers a metaphysical story in which the One, an arche of formless 
infinity, gives birth to Intellect (nous), which is itself Being, formed and bound.  Here 
we are presented with a question of transcendence, and this question begets a crisis: how 
do we get from the one to the other (for this indeed amounts to getting from the One to 
the “other”)?  Upon reflection, we recognize the gulf that separates the two, seemingly 
irrevocably.  As soon as difference is present in its determinacy, unity is fractured 
beyond repair.  Literally, the one cannot be the other.  Any attempt for reconciliation 
annihilates the content of both sides in its entailment of the sublation of otherness.   
 So in what way does either side reach across the present chasm?  How is it 
possible to relate Intellect to the One?  In the present exercise I mean to show that the 
boundary separating infinite from finite is well-considered in Plotinus, and out of his 
speculation thereupon coalesces an act which accounts for form and otherness, for logic 
and existence.  I will consider logos in Plotinus, but only insofar as it relates to nous and 
to the One.  Similarly, this work may be described as a contemplation of contemplation, 
but only in the sense of the primal glance cast by nous toward its father.  I offer no 
critical treatment of the lower hypostases here, for although they are instrumental in 
filling out the Plotinean picture of the finite realm, they are in an important sense 
contained in their progenitor, i.e. in Intellect.  While unqualified (infinite) multiplicity 
evinces itself finally in unformed hyle, in nous are finitude and multiplicity first realized.  
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As such, an understanding of this primary moment of transcendence will provide a 
scaffold on which an understanding of the transcendental transition between subsequent 
hypostases and other beings may be constructed.   
 The history of these concepts obviously reaches further back than Plotinus: the 
problem of the One and the Many is arguably the oldest in the history of Western 
thought.  I begin with a brief analysis of the founding of relevant notions, and this 
exploration must conceal certain lights if it is to reveal others in relief.  In thus 
grounding the concepts to be discussed, I hope that I may later clarify more lucidly the 
dialectical tension present in the Plotinean account of the genesis of the intelligible 
realm.  Finally, I mean to resolve this tension by embracing it in a critical description of 
the emergent two-sided act of creation. 
 
Foundation 
 In the nascent primacy of Pre-Socratic speculation, Hellenic philosophy seems 
already to have advanced a concept of utmost perfection.  Although others had 
anticipated aspects of this notion, it was Parmenides who perhaps most fully initialized 
an articulation of the way of Being.  That which transcends mortal opinion was said by 
the goddess to be “whole and of a single kind and unshaken and perfect.”5  He expounds 
further on the nature of what is: “For you will not find thinking without what is,” and 
again, “being equal to itself on every side, it lies uniformly within its limits.”6  
Parmenides offers a picture of perfect Being as an eternal, static sphere, unchanging.   
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 When we consider the above quotes (and others like them from Fragment 8), the 
notion is enlivened more fully. “Whole” says that Being is not composed of parts – there 
is no otherness within Being, for Parmenides.  “Of a single kind” seems to endorse some 
sort of monism (at least with respect to the way of “is”).  “Unshaken” is a curiously 
selected modifier; it seems to connote the static nature of Parmenidean Being.  In noting 
that “you will not find thinking without what is,” Parmenides declares that intellection is 
not (does not exist) outside of Being – Being is a necessary condition for Intellect.7   
Finally, the declaration that Being is “equal to itself on every side” and “lies 
uniformly within its limits” is perhaps most important for the present analysis.  What is 
it for Being to have a “side?”  In speaking of Being as a sphere,8 Parmenides 
(metaphorically or otherwise) invokes the concept of surface and consequently of 
boundary.  There are “limits” to Being; that is, Being is defined.  It is not necessary to 
explore the riddle of Parmenides’ metaphor further here.  Relevant to the present 
discussion is the fact that the notion of ultimate perfection in Hellenic philosophy (here 
expressed in the words of he who is perhaps its prime founder) is a notion embracing 
form.  Being is formed, and its form involves “thinking” and static perfection.9   
Plotinus inherits the notion of Being from his Hellenic predecessors, and he 
incorporates it in his idea of nous.  For Plotinus, Intellect is indeed formed, and thus does 
it comprise the Forms.   R. T. Wallis declares that Plotinean nous “appears as the 
apotheosis of traditional Greek ideas of perfection.”10  In nous are limit, thought, and 
Being introduced, and all that is is an outpouring of Intellect.  A speculative thorn, 
 10
however, seems to have prevented Plotinus from affirming nous as the highest ideal of 
perfection.   
Throughout his metaphysics, Plotinus operates under the unargued-for 
assumption that unity is somehow logically (and therefore cosmologically) prior to 
multiplicity – i.e. that unity is in some sense more perfect than multiplicity.  Thought 
entails multiplicity, as is evident in the generation of a progression of ideas by a thinker.  
There exists more than one Form: Intellect has many (finitely many, but many 
nonetheless) facets.  Plotinus believes this multiplicity to have flowed from some prior 
unity, one which precedes thought, number, limit, and Being.11  Wallis notes that “the 
very fact that Intelligence [nous] has limits [disqualifies] its claim to be the highest 
reality.”12  Form and limit entail difference, and difference entails multiplicity.13  
Plotinus regards these things as less perfect than ultimate unity, formless and 
undifferentiated. 
Plotinus organizes reality as a hierarchy of Beings descending from the 
intelligible realm into the sensible.14  At the top of this chain is nous, but above (this 
preposition will have to suffice at present) Intellect there is One.  I will say “the One,” 
because although the presence of the definite article connotes isolation from surrounding 
existents and in so doing implicitly limits its object of articulation, there seems 
nevertheless to be an important sense in which the One is not Intellect.  How precisely 
this differentiation manifests itself will be discussed below.  J. M. Rist holds that the 
One is so called “because it is exactly what it is, an entirely indivisible unity.”15  Though 
this comment is in the right spirit, it may be misleading: the point is not that the One 
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participates in the Form “one” or “unity,” but that the One is prior to Being and as such 
is not amenable to division or multiplicity.  In its simplicity, the One transcends such 
conceptions of whole and part: it is not the kind of thing to which those Forms refer (or, 
more Platonically, which refers to those Forms).   
Aristotle posited Intellect as eternal and primary; Plato conceives of Being as the 
progenitor of the Idea.  As is often the case in Plotinus’ metaphysics, he accepts some of 
each and modifies the rest.16  The prime arche of Plotinus is eternal and also infinite, but 
as noted above, thought implies multiplicity and cannot therefore be the One.17  In 
holding to (his own interpretation of) Parmenides’ statement that “thinking and being are 
the same,” Plotinus rejects Being as primary, but sets Being and Intellect together as 
nous.  As such, he sets out his hierarchy: nous comes from the One, and psyche in turn 
comes from nous.18   
Plotinus offers a positive definition for the One: 
What is it [One], then?  The productive power of all things; if it did 
not exist, neither would all things, nor would Intellect be the first and 
universal life.19
 
Armstrong stresses that “productive power” (dynamis) not be interpreted as Aristotelian 
potentiality, e.g. some divine hyle as yet unlimited, waiting on the Forms of Intellect for 
activation.20  “Power” is eternal act, always already proceeding and returning as limitless 
source.21  Plotinus here declares that Intellect depends on the One for its existence and 
life.  Though the One transcends all things,22 all things depend on the One.  What, 
though, is the essence of this dynamis?  Plotinus scorns such questions, declaring their 
structure to be misbegotten. 
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[I]t would be absurd to seek to comprehend that boundless nature; for 
anyone who wants to do this has put himself out of the way of 
following at all, even the least distance, in its traces; but just as he who 
wishes to see the intelligible nature will contemplate what is beyond 
the perceptible if he has no mental image of the perceptible, so he who 
wishes to contemplate what is beyond the intelligible will contemplate 
it when he has let all the intelligible go; he will learn that it is by 
means of the intelligible, but what it is like by letting the intelligible 
go.23   
 
What is to be made of the precaution against seeking to “comprehend that boundless 
nature?”  When one comprehends, one grasps a thing completely.  But the One is 
amenable neither to grasping nor to being complete; both such predicates imply form 
and limit.  Above I lit flares against such conceptualization, just because the Plotinean 
One is not the kind of thing that can be isolated, taken as a this apart from others.  To do 
so, Plotinus instructs, is to lose even any trace of that which is desired.  The intelligible 
(Intellect) attests to the presence of the One, but learning what the One is like cannot be 
a function of Intellect.  Intellect discerns, and the One is not like those things which are 
discernible.   
 As is frequently the case in the Enneads, Plotinus realizes that his syntax for 
description is crumbling beneath him, and he attempts apologetically to outrace his 
language: 
But this “what it is like” must indicate that it is “not like:” for there is 
no “being like” in what is not a “something.”  But we in our travail do 
not know what we ought to say, and are speaking of what cannot be 
spoken, and give it a name because we want to indicate it to ourselves 
as best we can.24
 
Analogy and (by implication) predication, Plotinus contends, fall short at the feet of the 
One.  In the last sentence, he notes that we seem dumbly to point at the One, declaring 
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the One “to ourselves as best we can.”  Plotinus self-consciously proceeds linguistically 
in his evaluation of the One, for what other analytical tools could he possess? 
 For his part, Gerson maintains that in denying predication of the One, Plotinus is 
merely denying any predication that would “imply composition,” i.e. that of essence and 
existence.  He notes that, for example, the One could have no accidental attributes such 
that accidents are “distinct from their subject,” nor essential attributes, if that which is 
“essential” is taken in any sense to be apart from that which exists.25  The One, then, 
would be the absolute unity of essence with existence, a distinction which only arises 
with Intellect’s in-forming of Being.   
 Notwithstanding Gerson’s anachronistic use of the essence/existence distinction 
(an anachronism which he explicitly acknowledges and then chooses to disregard), his 
position seems correct, if somewhat misleadingly redundant.  Predication seems 
necessarily to imply otherness at least: if predicates did nothing more than state identity 
relations, they would be names, not predicates.  Otherness is a clear prerequisite to 
composition.  In the same way, the words “accidental” and “essential” seem to 
presuppose some composition within an existing thing; 26 indeed, attribution itself 
connotes composition.  The One, of course, is said by Plotinus to transcend composition.  
Predication and attribution, therefore, seem necessarily to entail composition.  As such, 
Gerson’s qualification does not seem to subtract any crucial points from Plotinus’ 
original statement of the One’s transcendence of predication, but neither does it add 
much of anything contentious. 
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 Plotinus distinguishes his hypostases in terms of having and wanting.  Psyche has 
and wants; nous has but does not want; the One neither has nor wants.27  In its 
perfection, the One lacks nothing.  For Plotinus, thought entails Being, and the One 
transcends thought; therefore it cannot be said to have any thing.  If it did, it would not 
be unified, for in having something, the One would be two: itself, and that which it 
had.28  Possession and desire are functions of difference, and the One, for Plotinus, is 
prior to difference.  This kind of logic is qualified, though; Plotinus asserts that the One 
“is not like something senseless; all things belong to it and are in it and with it.”29  The 
One itself, however, is not possessed of thing-hood.  The passage goes on to accord a 
kind of “life” and “self-consciousness” to the One, noting that it exists in a kind of 
“everlasting rest.”  These kinds of statements seem only to be sensible metaphorically, 
given that a literal reading would contradict the body of the Plotinean doctrine of the 
One.  
 
Genesis 
 The hierarchy is thus established: the One exists prior to Intellect, and Intellect is 
in some sense caused by the One.  This is to say that the limitless and perfect simple 
unity which transcends all form, boundary, and being somehow gives birth to that which 
is the beginning of these.  To state that the connection linking these two hypostases is 
not immediately evident would indeed be to state (to understate) the obvious.  One 
critical cosmological aspect of the question of transcendence is here presented: how does 
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the infinite generate that which is finite?  How are limit and logic primordially 
introduced to and bound up with being?   
 Though this issue must be addressed, there is a prior concern of no small 
significance.  Before it is asked how the One produces Intellect, let us ask why it is that 
the One should produce Intellect, or anything else for that matter.  We saw above that 
the One is perfect.  That which is perfect should lack nothing.  Plotinus is so far in total 
agreement.  Lacking nothing, though, why should the One produce?  It seems to us that 
that which is perfect is also complete (lacking nothing), and in its totality it would have 
no reason to generate anything else. 
 We may begin approaching this question in a fashion ignored by Plotinus, i.e. by 
questioning the grounds on which it is posed.  The question seeks a reason for the 
production of an other; in something of a Leibnizian way it asks for a principle of 
sufficient reason explaining why the cosmos acts as it does, cosmogonically speaking.  
Recall, however, that Plotinus does not endorse such a logical strategy in giving his 
account of the One.  The One is, for Plotinus, not a thing on which logic, language, or 
limit has a hold.  If this approach compromises intelligibility, so be it.30  The One 
transcends any rational principle,31 and in so doing transcends the sense of the question, 
“why should the One produce?” 
 This answer is partially unsatisfying, though, because the question of should can 
be approached from the other side with results less clean.  The query may be phrased, 
“why should any perfect thing produce?”  This question gets closer to the point of 
inquiry, for the real concern is not with the inner life of the super-rational One, but rather 
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with the notion that an entity termed “perfect” should seem to engage in the work of 
production at all.  As we know the world, something endeavors to produce because there 
is some other thing that it lacks.  But the One is such that it is not amenable to notions of 
otherness or lack (or indeed of endeavor, which implies potency). 
 Plotinus clarifies.  When it is said that the One “produces,” this is not intended to 
convey the sense that the One works out its potentiality toward some end, as a baker 
producing bread.  Instead, the One generates intellect as a spring overflows onto the 
ground.32  Plotinus founds his account of the genesis of the finite from the infinite on the 
organic principle that perfect things overflow, and in overflowing, they produce.  “Now 
when anything else comes to perfection,” he explains, “we see that it produces, and does 
not endure to remain by itself but makes something else . . . .”33  Such “perfect” things in 
the sensible world mimic the perfection of the One.  Thus Plotinus, as he does frequently 
in his treatment, approaches the question from the bottom up: we know that all existing 
things, up to and including intelligible nous, are produced by that which is simply 
perfect in its limitless infinity.  Knowing this, how could we suppose that the One would 
somehow lack the power to generate these things?34  The One cannot but overflow. 
 Deck introduces a qualification that is I think helpful at this point.  “The One, 
being perfect,” he notes, “overflows as it were.”35  This as it were marks what Deck 
believes to be Plotinus’ metaphorical attitude toward the One’s generativity.  The One 
may be said to overflow, but only if by “overflow” no corollary assumption is introduced 
such that all overflowing things must, in their overflowing, reduce themselves.  The 
One’s perfection is eternal, never lacking.  In generating Intellect, the One is 
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“unaffected.”  Deck remarks that “the One produces all things by having no need of 
them.”36  This statement can, I think, be explained as such: insofar as the One subsists 
beyond (prior to) the necessity of Being, it is the producer of all things possessed of 
Being and therefore of Being itself. 
 If “why” is answered well enough by stating that perfect things overflow by 
nature and the One is a perfect thing, we are left with the first question, that of “how.”  
What is the semantic significance of “produces?”  In answering this, Plotinus, like many 
speculative accounts of the genesis of the intelligible from the infinite, resorts to 
analogy.  In so doing, he warns against the literal interpretation of time-language.  “we 
must not let coming into being in time be an obstacle to our thought,” he exhorts.37  
Furthermore, we must not suppose that the One changes in its production: 
[W]hat comes into being from the One does so without the One being 
moved: for if anything came into being as a result of the One’s being 
moved, it would be the third starting from the One, not the second, 
since it would come after the movement.38
 
Consider the stream of this logic: the One is first; this premise we know prior to any 
further speculation.  A second premise is that nous follows immediately from the One.  
The hypothesis here is that there is no movement in the One’s generation of Intellect.  
Now suppose that this were not true; i.e., that there were some change or movement in 
the One.  If this were to be so, Plotinus reasons, Movement would itself come into 
existence prior to whatever it was that was supposed to be second to the One – in our 
case, nous.  Intellect, then, could not be the second.  Having arrived at an implicit 
contradiction, Plotinus is able to affirm his conclusion that the One is not moved in its 
creation of Intellect.  This argument is an absolutely critical element in Plotinean 
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cosmogony, and it hinges on the second premise – that nous follows immediately from 
the One.  For the truth of this premise, Plotinus seems to provide no noncircular 
argument.   
Below, the semantic problems brought about by his attempt to maintain this 
immediacy will become evident.  The content of the eternal act of emanation from the 
One seems itself to interrupt the ontological continuity posited by Plotinus.  Even as he 
speaks against movement as a prerequisite for the Being that is Intellect, his cosmogony 
seems to require this very provision.  In describing the acts of prohodos and epistrophē 
(i.e. the proceeding of the One for itself and returning of this procession for Intellect), 
Plotinus may be seen to be attempting an identification of that which is no longer the 
inner life of the One in itself, but is not yet nous conceived in and for itself.  The 
proceeding-and-returning seems to provide the link between finitude and infinity.39   
 Plotinus turns finally to the analogy of what has been labeled “emanation.”  His 
story: 
How did it come to be then, and what are we to think of as 
surrounding the One in its repose?  It must be a radiation from it while 
it remains unchanged, like the bright light of the sun which, so to 
speak, runs round it, springing from it continually while it remains 
unchanged.  All things which exist, as long as they remain in being, 
necessarily produce from their own substances, in dependence on their 
present power, a surrounding reality directed to what is outside them, a 
kind of image of the archetypes from which it was produced: fire 
produces the heat which comes from it; snow does not only keep its 
cold inside itself.40
 
In a vivid participial depiction, the genesis of Intellect is said to be “surrounding the One 
in its repose.”  The obvious allusion is to sunlight, flowing outward and surrounding an 
unmoved and undiminished (or so the ancients supposed) unity.41  Plotinus must tread 
very lightly here; he is in danger of ascribing multiplicity to the One.  Granting him (for 
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the present) the figurative equivocation he seeks here, we note that he distinguishes 
between energeia tēs ousias (primary act) and energeia ek tēs ousias (secondary act).  
These two acts are present (figuratively, Plotinus must maintain) in the One: the former 
constitutes the One in itself, a notion devoid of relation.  This act is comprised of the 
eternal residence of the One in its perfect simplicity.  The latter act is the One for 
Intellect and for itself, the overflowing act of the One from which nous emerges in and 
for itself.42   
We note this division, Plotinus says, in the sensible realm: there is the fire in 
itself (the energeia tēs ousias), and there is the warmth given off by the fire (the 
energeia ek tēs ousias) .  The heat of fire is “different from the thing itself,” i.e. the 
flames of fire.43  Ultimately the two collapse back onto one another, and fire-as-totality 
is rendered only in the flames together with the warmth, or snow together with the cold.  
Strictly speaking, then, I am not warmed by the primary act of fire; I am warmed by the 
secondary – the flames do not warm me; the heat of the flames warms me.  Similarly, the 
One in itself (qua primary act) does not differentiate or relate; differentiation and 
relation are born of the secondary act of the One.44   
 Of the One in itself we cannot speak; its transcendent simplicity lies beyond the 
negation and affirmation native to ordinary language.45  In treating of the secondary act 
(energeia ek tēs ousias) of the One, Plotinus offers another analogy from the natural 
world: 
For think of a spring which has no other origin, but gives the whole of 
itself to rivers, and is not used up by the rivers but remains itself at 
rest, but the rivers that rise from it, before each of them flows in a 
different direction, remain for a while all together, though each of 
them knows, in a way, the direction in which it is going to let its 
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stream flow; or of the life of a huge plant, which goes through the 
whole of it while its origin remains and is not dispersed over the 
whole, since it is, as it were, firmly settled in the root.  So this origin 
gives to the plant its whole life in its multiplicity, but remains itself 
not multiple but the origin of the multiple life.46
 
The upwelling flow of the spring into its rivers represents the secondary act of the One – 
the flow outward which generates Intellect, the source of varying Forms.  The spring 
“gives the whole of itself,” for if it held a part of itself back, there would be division in 
the generativity that is the secondary act of the One.  At the same time, the rivers are 
distinctly other than the spring, for Plotinus notes paradoxically that although the whole 
of the spring is given in the generation of rivers, the spring itself “is not used up” and 
“remains itself at rest.”  The whole of the One is invested in the overflow; there is no 
part of the One that is not overflowing.  Coeternally, the One is always already filled 
without deficiency.   
 Likewise, the origin in the root of the “huge plant” is the source of the life within 
it, but the life reaches beyond the root (the primary act).  The origin is unchanged even 
as life flows out from it to the rest of the plant (according to ancient biological 
principles).  The life achieves “multiplicity” as leaf, bark, fruit, and branch, but the 
source remains “firmly settled.”  The life is the secondary act of that source, and so in a 
sense the origin is to be found in all the diverse points of the plant; indeed, it could be 
said to be the unifying factor of the plant.  The being of the plant is caused by its source-
as-life. 
 Plotinus attempts to guard against the error of supposing that, because the One is 
said to be the cause of Intellect, certain Forms (i.e. Cause and Being) otherwise posterior 
to the One are herewith engaged in the secondary act of the One.  As such, Cause and 
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Being would be prior to Intellect, and this is nonsensical, for how can Being be prior to 
itself?  Plotinus explains that in talking about the One as a cause of Intellect, we are 
actually speaking of Intellect’s identity as Being caused.47  Thus “causation” is a 
relational description, but it operates from the side of the finite intelligible and not from 
the side of the infinite.48  Again, we come to a characterization of the secondary act of 
the One from the side of its effects: Plotinus operates from the bottom up, so to say.  
Unless there were an effect, we would not say that it were caused.  Therefore the One in 
and for itself is not properly described as a cause, except insofar as Intellect is essentially 
a product of the One’s overflow.  In this way can we know about the One, i.e. by 
reflecting from multiplicity to unity and from effect to cause.49  Given that the One is not 
of itself possessed of Being or being-a-cause, Intellect may be said to depend on that 
which is not, but only insofar as this means that the One transcends the dialectical logic 
of Is/Is-not.50
 The One is limitless unified simplicity, and from its secondary act results 
Intellect, a finite, multiplied plurality.  Intellect is a “One-Many,” a singular arche that is 
nous which is, for itself, the finitely numbered pantheon of Forms, each differentiated 
from an other.  Simplicity is thus compromised in the achievement of limit and form.51  
According to the great Plotinean metaphysical assumption, unity is prior to and more 
perfect than multiplicity.52  As the producer is the greater and the product the lesser, and 
as we know the product (nous) to be multiplied, the One must be absolute in its simple 
unity.53  The question arises, how did multiplicity come from the simplicity that is the 
One? 
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 Gerson describes Intellect as “coeternal . . . but subordinate” to the One.54  
Multiplicity does not arise in time; it is a mistake to suppose that the One was static and 
then began to produce Intellect as multiplicity.55  The One is always already the 
producer and the production (qua energeia ek tēs ousias) of Intellect.56  The two exist in 
an ontological hierarchy that is not described by temporal priority.  Gerson holds that 
“Intellect is generated from the One roughly as a plane figure is generated from a 
point.”57  This image, I think, is an excellent illustration both of the misapprehension of 
the Plotinean doctrine of emanation as a temporal outworking and also of the crisis of 
transcendence.  While it indeed makes no sense to ask when the plane came from the 
point; still at issue is how something with magnitude could be caused by something 
without it.  The question of how something multiple could be caused from something 
utterly unified operates in the same way.  How is it that, even though both are eternal, 
the One does not immediately take Intellect back up into itself?  Answer: the One is such 
that it overflows, and this overflow is the birth of Intellect.  Although the One is no way 
dependent on Intellect (for dependence would connote the presence of Being), were the 
Intellect not to exist, we would not know about the One as it exists in and for itself.   
 
Being, Logos, and Otherness 
Plotinus urges us to take care when ascribing qualities and predicates to the One.  
Although some kind of language must be used in human communication about the One, 
the One itself is linguistically isolated only at the peril of conceptual annihilation.  
Properly, the One should not be said to be “something” or “anything;” still less should it 
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be taken to be “everything.”  Plotinus reasons that “it is impossible to apprehend the One 
as a particular thing: for then it would not be the principle, but only that particular thing 
which you said it was.”58  By particularizing the One, we would be introducing 
multiplicity: in saying the One is This, we imply that it is not That.   
The One transcends the assignment of This-and-not-That precisely because This 
and That partake of Being.  But the One does not: “these things [existing entities] are 
beings, and being: so it [the One] is “beyond being.”59  In its primacy, nothing can be 
ascribed to the One, and no particular can describe it.  Although at some point language 
must take hold if we as analysts mean to treat of the subject, even the use of “it” as 
ostensive assignment is, strictly speaking, a violation.  As mentioned above, to say “the 
One” is to tread dangerously; the statement “the One is the One” should be reduced to 
“One is One,” and finally, ridding language of being-talk, simply “One.”60  Again, 
Plotinus requires that the simple which precedes all things not be “mixed with the things 
which derive from it .”61  Being itself is derived from the One, as are thought and 
conceptualization as functions of Intellect.  Thus, “there is ‘no concept or knowledge’ of 
it; it is indeed also said to be ‘beyond being’.”62
Being is itself a product.  It is the case that all things are, and all things that are 
partake of Being.  Said another way, if something participates in Being, then it is.  The 
One is prior to the totality of Being (that is, the realm of existing things conceived in 
Intellect), thus it cannot be said to participate in Being.  Therefore it is not the case that 
the One is; the One is not.63  Being and determinacy entail one another: to be is to be 
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something.  The One is undetermined, for determination is posterior to the One.  The 
One is no thing, so in what way may it be said to exist? 
Wallis says, “a simple affirmation of the One’s existence is therefore permissible, 
provided this is not understood as predicating Being of the One.”64  I confess to being 
unclear on his meaning here.  I have no notion of what it is to exist without being.  
Wallis chooses not to qualify this statement, and I am left only to determine that he 
conceives of existence as a state of affairs different from Being.  Exactly what this 
would constitute is to anyone’s guess.  For his part, Gerson denounces the denial of the 
One’s existence as “sheer confusion.”65  We can, he says, conceptualize about it without 
affirming predicates of the One.  It seems that he shares Wallis’ distinction regarding 
Being and existence, although Gerson comes to his conclusion through his doctrine 
regarding the One as the perfect identity of essence and existence.66   
Perl, on the other side, believes that these kinds of interpretations attempt to 
affirm the concept of “infinite being,” a concept which, he says, is “a contradiction in 
terms.”67  His rationale is simple enough: as was shown above, to be is to be determined 
as something.  If the One is, then it is something.  Plotinus will have no such 
determinacy posited of the limitless infinite.  Perl states that “the One, therefore, is not 
any thing, indeed is Nothing.”68   
What of this daring suggestion?  If by it Perl means to say that “it is not the case 
that the One is any thing; the One transcends thing-hood” (i.e. to deny the position that 
the One is some thing) then that seems to follow clearly enough from Plotinean 
metaphysics.  It seems entirely another matter, however, to make the positive assertion 
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(i.e. to affirm the negation) that “the One is Nothing.”  Even the capitalization of 
“Nothing” seems to connote a kind of determinacy of the notion: “Nothing” is itself 
bounded by some conceptualization.  As such, it would seem that the One can be 
“Nothing” no more than the One can be something. 
 Eugene Bales senses this lexical tension and regards the attempt to reconcile 
Being and Non-Being with respect to the One as producing an “insoluble dilemma.”69  
The ontological and the meontological,70 he says, are limited each to its own universe of 
discourse: when an attempt is made to combine positive and negative theology with 
respect to the infinite One, the boundary between Being and Non-Being confounds 
language.  Thus just as “infinite Being” constitutes an unbounded mixture of negative 
(“infinite”) and positive (“Being”) discourse (and it is this to which Perl objects), “the 
One is Nonbeing” itself mixes the positive “is” with the negative “Nonbeing,” resulting 
in an equally illogical construction. 
 Thus does a new question arise to the speculative fore: what constitutes 
permissible One-talk?  Plotinus provides guidelines: 
We do indeed say something about it, but we certainly do not speak it, 
and we have neither knowledge or thought of it . . . we have it 
[knowledge] in such a way that we speak about it, but do not speak it.  
For we say what it is not, but we do not say what it is: so that we speak 
about it from what comes after it.71
 
The obvious question for the Plotinean analysis is, what significant difference is there 
between speaking the One and speaking about the One?  The question is a question of 
logos, that irreducibly complex term connoting word, form, and limit.  Indeed, word 
confers form and in so doing confers limit.  To what logos should we appeal in this 
discussion?  Is there a logos of the One?   
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 The above passage goes a long way toward answering the last question.  In his 
prohibition against speaking the One, Plotinus seems to regard what I will here term 
such “direct” One-talk to be based in ignorance: “we have neither knowledge or thought 
of it.”  Furthermore, the One is prior to Being, and form (for Plotinus) is born of Being.  
Thus Plotinus maintains that the One cannot – as has been restated many times here – be 
constrained by form.  Rist remarks that “the Intelligible World itself, Mind and its 
powers, is a trace of the One.  And Mind is Form . . . .  Hence the One cannot be a Form, 
a finite Being.  Rather it is shapeless and formless.  It is the maker of Form.”72  Thus 
there can be no logos of the One in itself, and so we cannot speak the One. 
 In speaking about the One, however, Plotinus notes that we “speak about it from 
what comes after it.”  Any logos relating to the One is subordinate to the One.  In fact, 
Plotinean metaphysics embraces the idea of logos as operative among many hypostatic 
levels of existence in both the sensible and intelligible realms.  Since we are here 
concerned primarily with the infinite’s relation to that first product of genesis, finite 
nous, we want to know whether there is a logos for nous, and if so, how that would 
impact thought and speech about the One, for, as Plotinus says, we speak about the One 
from the standpoint of Intellect, its progeny.   
 In Wallis’ view, Plotinean logos “expresses the relation of an Hypostasis to its 
source, its products, or simultaneously to both.”73  As such, prime logos would in some 
manner express the relation of nous to the One and vice versa.  Wallis suggests that this 
logical expression is analogous to the manner in which the Stoics conceived that the 
logos prophorikos (formed speech) expresses the logos endiathētos (thoughts).  The 
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going-forth of Intellect from its origin constitutes one aspect of primal logos.  The 
ontology of Intellect is thus delivered through the genesis of a rational forming 
principle.74   
John Heiser, in his treatise on logos in Plotinus, states that “Plotinus comes 
habitually to use the term logos to designate the mirroring forth on a lower level of what 
is found more truly at a higher level of things . . . .  And since logos is a mirroring forth 
of Intellect, each level of logos  is a higher or lower level of ‘contemplation.’”75  So it is 
the very logos of nous that relates Intellect to the One.  Intellect is the primary 
instantiation of form at the intelligible level, and thus it is identical with Being in its 
determinacy.  Seemingly, then, nous would constitute the very forming principle from 
which generation occurs: the generated would in a sense be the generator.  For indeed 
how could nous be formed unless form were ontologically prior?  Deck sees Intellect 
itself as a logos, “bringing about a presence of Nous in its inferiors.”76  Intellect is a 
logos for another; that is well enough, but how may it be said that nous is a logos for 
itself?  Here I can provide no textually faithful interpretation that does not call critical 
Plotinean cosmogonical principles into question.  The interpretation of these issues will 
be explored in greater detail below.   
 Intellect is, and Intellect is Being.  To be, as we have seen, is to be determinate.  
Perl argues as follows: 
If to be is to be determinate, then, necessarily, to be is to be other . . . .  
Determination is the very ground of being and in that sense the cause 
or maker of that which it determines.  Whatever is determinate, and 
thus whatever is, depends on its determination in order to be.77
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This passage seems to clarify some of the above concerns: determination-as-forming-
principle founds Being-as-Intellect.  In saying that it is thus “the cause or maker of that 
which it determines,” Perl is saying that Form forms Intellect.  Unformed, Being is not.78  
Form, and therefore otherness, is in this sense presupposed of Intellect.  Consider 
Plotinus: 
If, then, the truest life is life by thought, and is the same thing as the 
truest thought, then the truest thought lives, and contemplation, and 
the object of contemplation . . . are one.  So, if the two are one, how is 
this one many?  Because what it contemplates is not one.  For when it 
contemplates the One, it does not contemplate it as one: otherwise it 
would not become intellect.  But beginning as one it did not stay as it 
began, but, without noticing it, became many, as if heavy [with 
drunken sleep] . . . .79
 
Cryptic and compounded as this offering seems, Plotinus is here revealing the 
considerations we have been approaching.  The crucial element to this explanation is the 
contention that Intellect “did not stay as it began.”  The implication here is one-sided in 
its determinacy – the One does not differ from anything in its primary act (energeia tēs 
ousias).  Intellect differed, for “it did not stay as it began.”  The becoming of Intellect is 
an eternal occurrence, an outworking of motion and otherness.80  Plotinus recognized 
this, and spoke to the very issue. 
For there could not be thinking without otherness, and also sameness.  
These then are primary, Intellect, Being, Otherness, Sameness; but one 
must also include Motion and Rest.  One must include movement if 
there is thought, and rest that it may think the same; and otherness, 
that there may be thinker and thought or else, if you take away 
otherness, it will become one and keep silent; and the objects of 
thought also, must have otherness in relation to each other.  But one 
must include sameness, because it is one with itself, and all have some 
common unity; and the distinctive quality of each is otherness.81
 
Sameness and Otherness are seen to be prime requisites of formation, and the logic of 
the genesis of nous is governed by principles of unity and of differentiation.  Thus 
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contemplation as the impetus for an identity relation presupposes otherness in its 
outworking – each difference is a similarity; each similarity a difference.82  Intellect is 
formatively defined in its relief against the One (and not, importantly, the other way 
around).83  I maintain that such a presupposition of Form as an entity logically prior to 
Intellect is the position of Plotinus, and I will contend that his description of the relation 
of nous to the One must ultimately admit of the mediation of Form and Differentiation. 
 
Proceeding and Returning 
 In examining the nature of prime logos, let us revisit the genesis of Intellect from 
the One.  We know that Intellect is said to flow directly from the One, and Intellect is 
caused by the One.  Plotinus gives an account of the mechanism of this causation: 
In order that Being may exist, the One is not being, but the generator 
of being.  This, we may say, is the first act of generation: the One . . . 
overflows, as it were, and its superabundance makes something other 
than itself.  This, when it has come into being, turns back upon the 
One and is filled, and becomes Intellect by looking towards it.84
 
The steps of this process are described as follows: 1) the One, perfect, overflows; 2) in 
overflowing, it makes an other; 3) once this other is present, it “turns back” to its source 
“and is filled” 4) the other “becomes” nous.  Our perpetual precaution is in order here; 
the genesis of Intellect takes place under an eternal syntax, so time language 
(“becomes,” “turns,” “overflows”) is potentially misleading.  Intellect is always already 
the product of the One, and its causation is not a temporal act but the suggestion of the 
logical priority of the One to nous.  Nonetheless, it is clear that Plotinus regards the 
making of an “other” as prior to that “other” achieving its identity as Intellect.  There is 
the going forth, and there is the turning back.  Upon that turning back, that which went 
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forth (“went” is, here again, temporal language used to denote logical priority) is – 
eternally – Intellect.   
 The overflow of the One is not of itself solely the generation of Intellect from the 
One.  There is another dimension.  “How then does it generate Intellect?” asks Plotinus.  
“Because by its return to it it sees: and this seeing is Intellect.”85  The second side of 
Intellect’s emanation is the returning of the procession to its source.  The One overflows: 
this is its secondary activity.  This overflow proceeds from the One and then turns back 
in contemplation of its source.  In this turning back, the Being of Intellect emerges.   
 Neither the inner life of the One nor the being of Intellect is responsible for the 
definition of Intellect in and for itself.  This is the work of the returning of the procession 
to its source.  Plotinus seems to differentiate that which proceeds from the origin: 
Rather, the intellect must return, so to speak, backwards, and give itself up, in 
a way, to what lies behind it (for it faces both directions); and there, if it 
wishes to see that First Principle, it must not be altogether intellect.86
 
This passage constitutes a slight variation on the above: in V.1.7, the procession seems 
to be One until it returns; at that point it “becomes” nous.  Here, however, Plotinus 
names the procession “Intellect” prior to its return.  As was noted above, Plotinus may 
be grasping at identity for the notion which is not any longer identifiable with the inner 
life of the One in itself, but is not yet Intellect in and for itself.  The going-out and 
turning-back seems to bridge bounded Intellect and limitless One.   
Wallis recognizes Plotinus’ identification of the double nature of this act: 
Two stages may therefore be distinguished in the self-creation of 
Intelligence (and, on a lower level, of Soul); in the former, that of 
Procession (prohodos), a formless, infinite stream of life flows forth 
from the One; in the latter, that of Reversion (epistrophē), it turns 
back, contemplates the One, and so receives form and order . . . .87
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The side of the act for the One is prohodos; the side of the act as Intellect for the One is 
epistrophē.  The double act flowing from the One-as-source (energeia tēs ousias) is 
itself the act of the formation of nous.  Plotinus has presented a foundation for 
cosmology: the One resides in itself, and flows for itself as a result of perfection.  This 
flow is the secondary act of the One (energeia ek tēs ousias), a two-way path the notion 
of which founds the logic of nous, which itself is the beginning. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SUPREME CROWN 
Those who are wise shall shine like the brightness of the sky, and 
those who lead many to righteousness, like the stars forever and 
ever.88
 
 One scarcely begins an analysis of the notions involved within the nature of keter 
elyon, the supreme crown, before one is at once confronted with impenetrability: it is 
encountered at the spark of blackness within ein sof,89 within the symbolism of 
flickering flames, wellsprings, and supernal points, at the articulation of the primal 
cosmogonical language, and in the riddling eternity of keter’s commingling with ein sof 
as a garment “clinging to the substance of the wearer on all sides.”90  In many such 
speculative metaphysics, the most primordial root of being seems to commingle closely 
with nothingness, and the shroud of unknowable God appears in many accounts as void 
itself.91   What is more, Kabbalistic reflections can frequently be seen to have derived 
ontological principles from epistemic claims: the unknowable is nothingness.  Taken 
together, these kinds of presuppositions can alternatively obscure and illuminate the 
subject matter.  The present task is a task of definition, and as we will see, such is the 
task of the first divine emanation.  Illuminating or obscuring – shedding light or 
shedding darkness – is just the semantic issue that here complements the complex 
metaphysical role of keter.   
 Before beginning to articulate some themes common to Kabbalistic descriptions 
God’s inmost expression, I want to delineate some parameters for discussion.  The study 
here will attempt to limit its scope to philosophical content, as opposed to devoting much 
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focus to theurgical-magical approaches, ecstatically mystical content, and/or exclusively 
midrashic or homiletic accounts.  While one must surely concede the interrelated nature 
of such a dialogically vital tradition as Kabbalah, overall, my project is to analyze 
metaphysical speculation rather than to appreciate moments in religious literature.  A 
good deal of works and commentaries that would otherwise count as “Kabbalistic” will, 
therefore, be omitted (e.g. early Chariot hymns and the Shi’ur Komah).  It will 
nonetheless be evident that the poiesis which fundamentally informs such reflection 
permeates the philosophical/theosophical tradition in question, investing and 
invigorating the style of the Zohar as well as other works.  This will perhaps lend an 
ineffable quality to the notions inherent in some of the texts; while any attempt to “get 
beyond language” is a philosophically presumptuous move (and that, I think, is being 
charitable), at some point the ladder of explanatory language must be kicked away.92
 A further word regarding domain should be set out.  My comments here will 
revolve around the thirteenth-through-seventeenth-century tradition centered around 
general ideas common to at least some of the following: Moses of Leon (focusing on, 
but not limited to, the Zohar), Moses Cordovero, Isaac the Blind, Azriel of Gerona, and 
other leading figures of the schools of Gerona, Provençe, and Spain.  To some lesser 
degree I will consider Lurianic ideas, but where this enters my analysis I will attempt to 
make clear the distinction between the ideas inherited from Isaac Luria (and his pupils) 
and the mostly earlier European concepts.    
I will divide this exposition into five parts, each of which will consider both 
general principles of agreement as well as critical points of contention or intra-canonical 
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dissent about keter among Kabbalists of the 400 or so years in consideration.  The points 
of disagreement will prove, I hope, as illuminating as the general principles upon which 
most of the sages seem to agree.  The most critical aspects of a given philosophy are 
frequently the most heavily debated, and Kabbalistic metaphysics are no exception.   
 
General Principles of keter elyon 
 Without a cursory understanding of the fundamental ideas of God and the 
sephirot, a discussion of keter will obviously come across as insurmountably obscure.  
Given that, even with a scholar’s grasp of these metaphysical tenets, vagueness and 
ambiguity nevertheless cloud the nature and notion of the first emanation, we should 
seek to clear away as much conceptual mist as possible.  Briefly, I will offer a sketch of 
the cosmological model in question.93  The earliest account of sephirot as ten cosmic 
elements (for lack of a more precise term) comes from the Sefer ha-Yetzirah, 1:3-7:   
3Ten Sephirot Belimah according to the number of ten fingers.  Five 
opposite five . . . 4Ten and not nine.  Ten and not eleven . . . 5Their 
measure without end.  Depth of beginning.  Depth of end.  Depth of 
Tov [goodness] . . . 6their apparition as lightning; their aim has no end.  
Its utterance with [or, in] them with its course and return and when its 
word is like the tempest they descend in front of the throne and they 
carouse . . . 7Their end is fixed at the beginning, their beginning at 
their end.94
 
This mystifyingly brief and virtually impenetrable text predates both the 
Kabbalistic schools of Provençe and the writing of the Sefer ha-Bahir.95  The precise 
time of its origin is as unrevealed as its content: varying scholarship dates the work, 
which features obvious Hellenistic influences, between the second and sixth centuries.96  
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The passage here describes ten sephirot as cosmogonical elements, and the remainder of 
the first short chapter details their alphanumeric metaphysical significance.   
 Kabbalistic doctrine since the Sefer ha-Yetzirah has embraced the idea of ten 
cosmic hypostases emanating from the infinity of unknowable God.  At some primordial 
point, ein sof (a hypostatization denoting concealed God as “limitless”) emanates these 
ten gems of light97 as the first determinate content of the cosmos.98  Without attempting 
a thorough explication of the role of the sephirot in the creation of the world, it may be 
stated that in some basic sense, these emanations act as a bridge of sorts from God in His 
infinity to man in his finitude.  Indeed, given that the chief concerns of Kabbalah involve 
the distinction between God in Himself and God for man, it is unsurprising that central 
stress is laid on the manner in which it can be said that God relates ontologically to His 
creations.99  It is evident that the sephirot are considered, though not described as, 
nonphysical entities.  The word-images used to speak of the sephirot in Kabbalah are 
themselves vividly and potently philosophically suggestive: the entities are variously 
described as ma’amarot (“sayings” – this nomenclature occurs throughout the Sefer ha-
Bahir, conceptually supplemented with the term “logoi,”100 the philosophical 
significance of which can hardly be overstated), shemot (“names”), marot (“mirrors”), 
and sitrin (“aspects,” “powers,” or “levels”), to name a few of many.101   
 The purpose of the sephirot, then, is to act not only as conduits for the vitality of 
eternal God but also as negations of the infinite; that is, as foundations for determinacy.  
Though ein sof exists (if such a thing can be said) eternally in the utter concealment of 
its own limitlessness, through the emanation of the sephirot God’s power takes on a 
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differentiated character as it begins to act according to context.  Consequently, both 
unities and distinctions begin to appear.  Difference is the first result of the emanation 
(being itself the nature of that emanation), always already accompanied by will, thought, 
understanding, love, judgment, and beauty.  Thus the full notion of divinity is realized 
only upon the negation of its concealed and infinite nature.   
 The questions and presuppositions implicit in this abbreviated account will now 
be scrutinized through the lens of the first of all emanations, which is the simultaneous 
differentiation-birth of name, form, and will.  Through an examination of the general 
principles of keter, an understanding of the transcendent role of the sephirot may be 
more surely grasped.  It is this very transcendent role which constitutes in Kabbalah the 
role of transcendence; therefore such may also be understood once a full foundation of 
the notion of the first archetype has been constructed.  We turn now to the first principle. 
 
First of All Emanations 
 When confronted by the spectrum of different speculative accounts of the nature 
of the first emanation,102 it is evident that the above statement will not do as a general 
rule, even within the confines of so-called “classical” Kabbalah.  Rather, it should be 
revised to read something like,  
I1.  In those accounts in which keter is mentioned as one of the ten 
sephirot, keter is defined as the first of all emanations. 
 
It is unclear whether the time-language of Kabbalistic cosmogony should be taken 
literally or figuratively, and this exegetical question seems to have provoked different 
answers depending on the context in which it is posed.  Where keter is mentioned, 
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however, it seems to embrace a kind of ontological priority as the cause of the rest of the 
sephirot. 
 Still, the manner in which this influence is understood is by no means a foregone 
conclusion.  I want to declare one interpretive generalization at the outset of this 
analysis, lest the conclusions reached here come under the accusation of having required 
an unstated hypothesis.  Keter is not the only name used to denote the first emanation, 
and I want clearly to delineate which words I take to be referring to keter and which I 
take to be referring to something else.   
 As a general rule, I take hokhmah, the second emanation that is wisdom, always 
to be distinct from keter.  Some accounts (mostly earlier in the classical period) take 
keter to be identifiable with ein sof, and to this issue we will later return.103  Suffice it to 
note that in accounts in which keter is not distinguished ontologically from ein sof, 
hokhmah frequently takes the place of the first distinct emanation of ein sof.  In no 
instance I have encountered does hokhmah seem to me to be simply a terminological 
variation for keter.  However interrelated the seminal purposes of these two sephirot 
may be, the fact that most accounts feature both keter and hokhmah with the latter 
having been caused by the former is sufficient reason to believe that, whatever the 
ontological status of keter relative to ein sof, the notion of hokhmah differs quite 
markedly from that of keter.104   
 Variations on the name keter elyon that seem to refer to the same metaphysical 
entity include rum ma’alah, ehyeh, bozina di-kardinuta (kav ha-midah), and attika 
kadisha (attika attikin), to name some of the most common.  Rum ma’alah (“highest 
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point above” or “supernal point”) denotes the status of keter as the utmost distinguished 
entity that is.  Ehyeh (“I shall be,” “I am”) reinforces this concept of all paths of being 
leading ultimately to this source.105  Bozina di-kardinuta (“spark of blackness”) is an 
image utilized for cosmogonical principles in the Zohar; its further explanation is kav 
ha-midah (“standard of measure”).106  Attika kadisha (“the Holy Ancient One”) is a 
reverent identification of the divine status of the first emanation.107  The sense of the 
term ayin (“nothingness”) will be discussed at length below; it seems, however, that the 
semantics of identification with keter are, to say the least, more complex in that case. 
 We revise I1 to the following: 
I2.  In those accounts in which keter is either mentioned or apparently 
referenced under another name as one of the ten sephirot, keter is 
defined as the first of all emanations. 
 
I2 is not intended as a groundbreaking commentary on metaphysics of the divine.  It 
merely tells us that if keter or something reasonably like it is a feature of some 
metaphysic of classical Kabbalah, keter takes the role of the first emanation of that 
system.  This, I think, is a reasonably catholic and relatively historically mild assertion.  
It is of crucial importance, however, to emphasize that I have not yet commented on 
whether classical Kabbalah considers keter to be metaphysically distinct from ein sof, 
and if so, to what extent.  This matter, obviously of critical importance, will be 
considered as one of the five points of contention enumerated below.   
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Keter as Source 
 If keter is not identical to hokhmah (divine wisdom), then two ramifications of 
such differentiation are evident.  Immediately, this nonidentity implies that keter is in 
some sense not wisdom.  Consequently, this implies that, if they are both sephirot, there 
exists some definable relationship between the two – a longer leap than the first claim, to 
be sure, but ultimately a defensible one, I believe.  Furthermore, the relationship of keter 
to the rest of the sephirot cannot be understood only through its immediate successor.  
Reference to the third sephira (binah – divine understanding), at least, must be made to 
explain the nature of both the first and the second.  The relationship among ein sof, keter, 
hokhmah, and binah is expressed in the Zohar thus: 
En-Sof cannot be known, and does not produce end or beginning like 
the primal Ayin (nothing), which does bring forth beginning and end.  
What is beginning?  The supernal point, which is the beginning of all, 
concealed and resting within thought and producing end that is called 
“The end of the matter” (Ecclesiastes 12:13).108
 
Cordovero elucidates the relationship as follows: 
Afterward, Ein Sof emanated one point from itself, one emanation.  
This is Keter, called Ayin, Nothingness, on account of its extreme 
subtlety, its cleaving to its source, such that being cannot be posited of 
it.  From Keter a second point emanated in a second revelation.  This 
is Hokhmah (Wisdom), called Yesh, Being, for it is the beginning of 
revelation and existence.  It is called yesh me-ayin, “being from 
nothingness.”  Because it is the beginning of being and not being 
itself, it required a third point to reveal what exists.  This is Binah 
(Understanding).109
 
Here we have the first emanation as primary to both “existence” and “beginning.”  One 
obvious question asked by Kabbalists was, if keter precedes existence and beginning, in 
what way can keter be said to be?  Later Kabbalists would attempt to resolve the paradox 
of the nothingness of keter by positing an external aspect, called da’at (“knowledge”).  
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Here we need only note that in classical Kabbalah, the root of the tree of the sephirot 
begins with keter before the differentiations of existence and beginning take 
metaphysical hold.110  As such, keter is the source of existence, beginning and end, 
thought, wisdom, and understanding, but it is not itself constituted by any of these 
predicates.   
 As the sephirot emanate, God is further differentiated into various aspects of the 
divine character.  This is not to say that Kabbalah is polytheistic: far from endorsing a 
pantheon of multiple divinities, the sephirot are constantly integrated with one another: 
relationships between each sephira with each and all of the others is just as crucial to 
Kabbalistic cosmology as the isolation of any one by itself.  Keter is particularly 
indicative of the relational character of Kabbalistic metaphysics: seemingly, less is said 
about keter in-itself than is said about keter as the first point, different from ein sof, 
which enables the beginning of the externality of God.111  There is a real sense in which 
keter is the turning-out of God; as the beginning of limitation, it constitutes the negation 
of ein sof in determinacy.  This point will be further explored when the concepts of 
nothingness and distinction from ein sof are examined below.   
 If keter precedes wisdom, understanding, love, judgment, and beauty, it cannot 
be said to be identical with any of these, but there must be some sense in which these 
predicates are implicit in its articulation.  There is a relationship of ontological priority 
among the sephirot such that each emanation is rooted in the preceding one.112  
Therefore, though keter is itself unformed by e.g. beauty, it founds divine beauty in its 
notion.  That is to say that if the logic of keter is fully understood, the logic of all of its 
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successors will be equally fully comprehended.  Keter is, in this sense, quite essentially 
the forming principle of the cosmos: it provides for the inception of individual 
formation, the beginning of beginnings.  It does not itself turn from ein sof, but in its 
differentiating expression of the will of God,113 it provides a cosmogonical axis on 
which divine wisdom and understanding begin to fulfill the revolution that is revelation.  
It is a point: not itself a shape, determinate, but the absolute dawn of the twin concepts 
of limitation and differentiation in the essence of God.  This step is a step toward form 
and a step toward immanence, though the notion of keter, in its “extreme subtlety,” is 
still one of utter transcendence.   
 
Cosmogonical Foundation, Cosmological Bridge 
 The Zohar portrays the contrast between ein sof and the sephirot as follows: 
[E]very sephira has a known name, an attribute, a limit, and an area.  
Through these names the Master of the world extends Himself, and He 
rules by them, receives His titles from them, conceals Himself in them, 
and dwells within them, like the soul with the limbs of the body . . . 
one should not call it by a single name, or two, or three, saying that it 
is “wise” or “discerning” . . . one should not assign him a known place 
or give him names . . . .114 [italics mine] 
 
The contrast involves the distinguishedness, the distinctive knowability of the sephirot 
as opposed to the infinite concealment of ein sof (God in-Himself).  It is implied here 
that ein sof (“Master of the world”) exercises dominion by/through the sephirot, with 
each individual sephira acting as an archetype for at least one aspect of the nature of 
God.  No attributes may be predicated of ein sof; such predication would evacuate the 
notion of some sephira as well as diminish the seamless simplicity of the infinity of ein 
sof.   
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 Ein sof engages, according to the passage, in five activities through the sephirot.  
Three of these are unmistakably active, the first and last being reflexively so: “extends,” 
“rules,” and “conceals” imply the action of ein sof on the whole of creation.  One of the 
actions is neutral: “dwells” implies a kind of existential passivity of ein sof and the 
sephirot.  Perhaps the most interesting of the acts of ein sof, however, is that the limitless 
“receives His titles from them.”  None of the other actions stated in the above passage 
alludes to the reciprocal character of the relationship of infinite God to His hypostases.  
“Receiving” denotes the active character of the sephirot themselves as well as the 
relational capacity of the archetypes to God in-Himself.   
 “Titles” seems to have a pair of connotations.  On one hand, succeeding “rules,” 
“titles” bears the regal sense of “rights of lordship.”  Under this reading, it could be 
reasoned that ein sof is reckoned “Master of the world” insofar as his powers, exercised 
through the sephirot, give him dominion over all creation.115  It is the sephirot that grant 
the title “Master” to ein sof: given that there can be no predication of God-in-Himself, 
without the differentiated cosmologically governing attributes of the sephirot, God-in-
Himself rules nothing.  Said another way, if God relates to nothing (and indeed ein sof 
does not), God rules nothing: God-as-Master presumes to itself God-as-relates. 
 A slightly different reading of “titles” would convey the sense of “archetypical 
name.”  It is in this sense that it may be said that the title of the first human creature was 
“Adam.”  “Adam” is “man” just as Adam was a man.  Thus it could be reasoned that ein 
sof is only titled (named) insofar as the sephirot posit metaphysical opposition to it in 
some way.116  Consider that God-in-Himself can sensibly be said to be limitless (ein sof) 
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only if there exists a limit or limited.  God is only “Master” if there exists at least one 
thing that is mastered.  Accordingly, this is one sense in which ein sof can be said to 
“dwell within them”: in Kabbalah, metaphysical significance seems to be caught up in 
semantic significance.  The existence of ein sof is posited just insofar as the sephirot can 
be said in some way to oppose it. 
 So much for predication on limitless God-in-Himself.  What, though, of keter?  
As we have seen, keter is the first sephira emanated from the infinite.  Its form acts as a 
principle for all subsequent emanations: it is the concealed beginning of beginnings.  
Just as keter presents the turning-away from limitless infinity (while yet cleaving to that 
infinity)117, it likewise presents a turning-toward the determinacy beginning in divine 
wisdom (hokhmah).  There is thus a sense in which all determinate opposition present in 
the sephirot is implicit in the notion of keter.  The above principles taken together 
impose crucial semantic (and therefore metaphysical) significance on the first sephira: 
keter is the first to be named,118 and thus it titles ein sof after itself.  Its role is essentially 
relational and always already negative: keter is the route by which the sephirot transcend 
determinacy to be taken up into the limitless mastery of ein sof.119  Ein sof, is, for its 
part, granted such mastery strictly on the opposition present in keter: its mastery, 
therefore, is subject to this negation.  We will revisit this very issue when the concept of 
keter as ayin is explored, below.   
 The Zohar describes keter as “a sacred name engraved in [God’s] extremities.”120  
Naming, speech, form, and thought all originate from the same supernal point: that is the 
 44
eternal existential ramification of ehyeh (“I am”).  This cosmogonical logic is caught up 
in the notion of the name, about which the Zohar says: 
This voice [composed by binah, the third sephira] comprised all the 
other powers.  And this voice governs speech, and produces a word in 
its correct form, since the voice was sent forth from the place of the 
spirit, and came to govern the word, to produce correct words.  And if 
you examine the levels . . . it is all one, and thought is the beginning of 
all, and there is no division . . . for it is actual thought connected with 
Ayin, and it is forever inseparable.121
 
Beginning early in classical Kabbalah and continuing throughout the era, the idea of 
names and language is caught up in the theory of emanation: the process by which the 
sephirot are determined is the selfsame process as that by which divine language reveals 
itself in creation.122  In the above passage, the voice of God (comprised of the fourth, 
fifth, and sixth sephirot) “came to govern the word, to produce correct words.”  This is 
to say that the inception of the divine language was a codification of a forming principle 
for language and speech as well as for creation.  It is from keter that the voice gains its 
dialectical significance.  The voice is described as “actual thought connected with Ayin . 
. . forever inseparable.”123  Consider further: 
[A] mystical symbol of this [Torah] is “the name YHVH” (Genesis 
16:13, and often): “name” is one, YHVH is one, and the whole is a 
single unity; for there is a name, and there is a name: a name above, 
which is inscribed by that which is not known and not susceptible to 
knowledge at all, and this is called the “supernal point”; a name 
below, which is called shem (name), “from one end of heaven to the 
other end of heaven” (Deuteronomy 4:32), because the end of the 
heavens is called “remembrance,” and this name is the “lower point,” 
a name for that “remembrance” which is the end of the heavens and 
receives all life in the realms above, and this is the end of the heavens 
below, and its name is the “lower point.”124 [italics mine] 
 
Here keter is described as the “supernal point” that is “the name above.”  Thus the very 
logic of naming is given its foundation in the first emanation.  The “lower name” is a 
“remembrance” of the “name above” in that keter is archetypal for all subsequent 
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emanations, and therefore for all subsequent names.  The divine language begun in 
YHVH is a crucial point in Kabbalistic cosmology: it marks the upper bound of the 
possibilities for contemplation of God’s nature.  To attempt intellectual penetration of 
the primordially linguistic character of keter is to dis-order (that is, to disrupt the proper 
order of) one’s cosmology: intellection and understanding are limited at points below 
keter.  Thus, although the first hypostasis grounds naming, form, and semantics, it is, 
because of its generative status, not approachable by these means.   
 Ein sof is infinite, indeterminate, and limitless.  None may (with any kind of 
truthfulness) speculate on the inward nature of ein sof;125 to name it in this fashion is to 
annihilate its content.126  God-in-Himself is thus unapproachable from the perspective of 
the created order.  Contrariwise, the sephirot are defined by their determinate contents; 
indeed, their archetypical names are titles as discussed above.  Such differentiation 
serves two opposing purposes: first, it distinguishes one sephira from another, and 
second, it unifies the notion of that sephira with itself.  The cosmic gulf between the 
unified-differentiated and the infinite-indefinite is bridged by keter. 
 Keter, as mentioned above, turns simultaneously away from the infinite dark-
light of its emanator127 and toward the determinate contents of the rest of the sephirot.  
As such, its place is vague, both epistemically and ontologically.  It is the foundation, the 
metaphysical axiom, on which are built the notions of beginning, difference, logic, and 
thought.  Its character is close to that of its maker, though; the light of the one is spread 
throughout the other. 128  This otherness, though, is just what gives rise to the cosmic 
language which defines the rest of the Godhead.  Without the distinction of keter, the 
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supernal limit bridging infinity and unity, there could be no sense in which the light of 
God fills the rest of the sephirot.  Even lit, the rest of the sephirot overflow with divine 
illumination, while ein sof never contains itself in any sense with which to begin.  Only 
keter, primal syntax, is perfectly primordially structured so as to contain the light of God 
and not itself be shattered.129  It therefore “does not lack and does not change.”130
 
The Differentiated Will of God 
 A critical point of contention for classical Kabbalists had to do with the 
distinction of keter from ein sof.  Was the first sephira metaphysically distinct from the 
indefinite infinite?  A puzzle immediately confronts the speculative ontologist: if keter 
be semantically distinguished from ein sof, in what way can its relative characteristics be 
commensurable with those of its infinitely simple originator – that is, how can the 
determinately unified originate from the limitless infinite?  If, on the other hand, keter is 
accorded a meaning too close to that of ein sof, keter loses its distinct identity altogether.  
This is the ancient Neoplatonic dilemma of accounting for the primal crisis of 
multiplicity.  In Kabbalah, the question takes on the form: how does God get from ein 
sof to sephirot?   
 This paradox of transcendence is compounded by the problem of keter’s utter 
contemplative impenetrability.  It is above intellection and “fills more than the mind can 
conceive.”131  In this respect it is like ein sof, whose inward nature is beyond any sort of 
contemplation.132  Keter in itself is similarly beyond predication: Kabbalists recognize 
that the tetragrammaton only hints of the nature of this first hypostasis, leaving keter 
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itself untitled.133  As such, generalizations about the complete notion of keter always 
stress its close metaphysical similarity (closer than any other sephira) to ein sof.  Keter is 
frequently described as cosmic “air,” “ether,” or a kind of luminous envelope bound up 
with ein sof.134  Such physical metaphors are obviously helpful only to a point.  At least, 
they seem to convey the idea that keter is sensibly indistinguishable from ein sof.  
Knowledge of such a differentiation comes only through a kind of deduction-by-
negation (see below).   
 At many points, the Zohar alludes to the closeness of keter and ein sof,135 
frequently mingling the two in its imagery, as here: 
What does “with (be)reshit [(in) the beginning]” mean?  With wisdom 
(hokhmah) . . . .  They [the sephirot] were created from here.  Who 
created them?  He who is not mentioned, that hidden one who is 
unknowable.136
 
There is no mention of the foundations of beginning in keter here: beginning is 
associated with hokhmah, and the creator of beginning is “that hidden one who is 
unknowable.”  Certainly this phrase remarks in some way on God-in-Himself.  It is only 
by examination of the use of the demonstrative “that” that one may realize that keter is 
here being described: ein sof would be amenable to no such ostensive description.  Both 
ein sof and keter are reckoned to be hidden, but only the latter may, given its uniquely 
relational (for-another) status, reasonably be termed “creator.”137
 Cordovero attests to the nonidentity of keter and ein sof, saying that “ein sof is 
not identical with keter, as many have thought.  Rather, ein sof is the cause of keter; 
keter is caused by ein sof, cause of causes . . . keter is the first to derive from it.”138  
Keter “derives” its causal priority from the ontological notion of ein sof.  It is this 
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relationship of metaphysical subordination by which the two are distinguished.  
According to the model of the tree, ein sof relates only to keter, which itself relates to the 
rest of the ten.139  There would be no harmony of divine hypostases without this initial 
derivation.  The careful reader here is moved to comment: it is well enough to say 
“initial derivation,” but how may we say that this unique, primordial relation is 
expressed?  Through what capacity is differentiation pressed-out from that which is, in 
its immediacy, an indeterminate infinity? 
 It was reasoned that this prime act of differentiation was accomplished through 
the eternal emergence and action of the will of God.140  In keter, the divine will 
manifests its expression, an expression primary to thought, wisdom, word, and 
understanding.  Before the craft of word, there is the necessity of will.  For many 
Kabbalists, difference implies will just as will implies difference: given the fact that 
nothing may be sensibly predicated of ein sof, it is the case that the primal act of God, 
the first act of will, entails the distinction of some hypostasis nonidentical to ein sof.141  
That is, if some entity wills, that entity must not be ein sof, since ein sof neither wills nor 
fails to will.  In action, the infinity of ein sof posits a determinate content.  This 
determinate content always already exercises its own essential nature (will), resulting in 
lower emanations.  As such, its transcendent and impenetrable character constitutes the 
beginning of beginnings.  Once the second (subsequent) sephira begins, the content of 
keter is taken up again into the notion of ein sof, thus constituting a determinate and 
transcendent external infinity.142  For Kabbalists, the outworking of the Will of God as 
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keter, distinct from ein sof, allows for the philosophical maintenance of the simplicity 
and static ineffability of the latter.143   
 Let us return from such speculation to the texts of Kabbalah.  Cordovero asserts 
that the “forehead of the Will [keter] constantly accepts and soothes the harsh powers, 
reintegrating them.”144  Thus keter humbly and charitably145 reintegrates subordinate 
powers, acting as an ordering principle over the distinguished hypostases of the divine.  
The Zohar expresses the unity of divine will with ein sof thus: 
When the supernal will in the highest realms rests upon the will that 
cannot ever be known or grasped, the most recondite head in the world 
above – and this head produced what it produced, which is not known, 
and illumined what it illumined, and all in secrecy – the desire of the 
supernal thought is to pursue it and be illumined by it.146
 
The “supernal will” is ein sof, which dwells in the expression of keter.147  Hokhmah 
(“supernal thought”) yearns for its perfected source: word and wisdom seek after 
ineffable divine will.  In its illumination, the universe is ordered harmoniously after the 
fashion of the will of God.  Thus the Zohar remarks, “[w]hen this Atika, the Will of 
wills, reveals itself, everything shines, and everything experiences perfect joy.”148  It 
seems that in its turning from its source (ein sof), keter transmits the divine light to all of 
its metaphysical subordinates.  This transmission, a kind of differentiated refraction, 
constitutes the first ontological revelation of God from God.  Keter, not itself identical to 
ein sof, nonetheless acts as “a garment clinging to the substance of the wearer on all 
sides,” ex-pressing the notion of the infinite as essential divine will.149
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Nothingness (ayin) 
 Having presented the syntactic structure for primordial expression, we now turn 
inward to an examination of the semantics of ein sof’s relationship to keter.  Dialectical 
self-negation characterizes the out-working of unknowable God’s primal act, and this is 
taken up in Kabbalah as ayin, mystical nothingness.  The foundation of the notion of 
ayin lies in the Kabbalistic belief that certain levels of reality are unreachable by 
thought.150  This epistemic position was extended to the ontological, thereby founding 
the idea that there exists a cosmic nothingness by which God defines Himself.  Thus 
Joseph Gikatilla remarks: 
The depth of primordial being is called Boundless.  Because of its 
concealment from all creatures above and below, it is also called 
Nothingness.  If one asks, “What is it?” the answer is, “Nothing,” 
meaning: No one can understand anything about it.  It is negated of 
every conception.  No one can know anything about it – except the 
belief that it exists.  Its existence cannot be grasped by anyone other 
than it.  Therefore its name is “I am becoming.”151
 
This philosophically rich and complex passage hints at the epistemic-ontological 
conflation implicit in the view of existence as a predicate.  Consider: if the Boundless is 
unknowable, then there is no sense in which an epistemic agent could predicate anything 
of it.  If existence is a predicate, then it cannot be said by any agent (except keter itself, 
in order to maintain self-identity) that keter exists.  If this cannot be said, then quite 
reasonably the answer to the question “What is it?” becomes “Nothing.”  If existence is 
implicitly posited of keter (and it must be, given that it is the source of hokhmah), there 
is a sense in which “nothingness” does not imply nonexistence.  But if there is no 
semantics of being for keter-in-itself, its existence can only be deduced from relational 
statements involving other cosmic entities.152  Therefore any interpretation of keter 
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involves its active causal essence (both as cause and effect).  This process is just that of 
keter’s “becoming:” the eternal dynamics of revolution for revelation.   
 Images abound in Kabbalah regarding the unknowable and impenetrable nature 
of keter.  Each sephira is assigned a respective color; keter has three.  It is variously 
white, black, or clear: the white color connotes its merciful humility,153 black signifies 
its hidden communion with ein sof, and clear pertains to its impenetrability from the 
perspective of subsequent emanations.154  Each sephira also has numeric significance.  
Given that hokhmah constitutes the cosmic beginning, it is one, the primordial point.  
Preceding hokhmah is ineffable keter; therefore keter is assigned zero according to its 
“nothingness.”155  These images testify to the relative emptiness of the content of keter. 
 I say “relative” since, if keter is nothing-for-subsequents, ein sof is absolute 
conceptual evacuation.  In its infinity; taking up all essences in its simplicity, ein sof is 
indescribable.  It is for this reason that keter clothes it outwardly (see above).  From 
these premises, Kabbalah presents another explanation of the nothingness of keter by 
moving dialectically from limitless infinity to the first emanation.  The Kabbalistic 
explanations of the mechanics of cosmogony relative to keter’s inception are varied and 
sometimes inconsistent with each other.  I want to stress some grounding principles for 
these accounts, however, that are, I believe, essential to each.  This will take on the form 
of a kind of generic account, an interpretation endorsed partially by most every classical 
Kabbalistic metaphysician and in its entirety by none.   
 One of the primary questions regarding the first emanation was whether it 
proceeds from God or whether it returned into God.156  The Kabbalists realized the 
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obvious: if the hypostatization ein sof was to carry any meaning, there must be some 
metaphysical sense in which it is limitless and infinite.  Prima facie, this would seem to 
imply a kind of untransgressable sine qua non for divine qualification: if ein sof is 
everything, then anything that is not ein sof has to be nothing.  Lurianic Kabbalah 
describes the mechanics of this process as a kind of divine back-drawing of ein sof into 
itself, leaving a void into which creation can begin (with hokhmah).157  The void is keter, 
the foundation for beginning.  This process marks a kind of turning away from infinity, 
but the irony of this cosmic drama consists in the fact that revelation necessitates this 
very move.  The concept of contrast is fundamental to the primordial ontology of 
Kabbalah.  The Zohar declares of ein sof that “no light can look upon Him without 
becoming dark”158 and that keter presents “the spark of blackness”159 from which the 
beginning begins.   
 The meaning of these passages is caught up in the primal dialectic of source and 
emanation: ein sof is infinite light, but without contrast (and according to its unknowable 
character), it may as well be utter darkness.  It is only when keter is set up as a contrast 
(semantic, epistemic, and metaphysical) to the limitless that the light of infinite God is 
seen to be as bright as it is.  Cordovero describes it thus: 
When powerful light is concealed and clothed in a garment, it is 
revealed.  Though concealed, the light is actually revealed, for were it 
not concealed, it could not be revealed.  This is like wishing to gaze at 
the dazzling sun.  Its dazzle conceals it, for you cannot look at its 
overwhelming brilliance.  Yet when you conceal it – looking at it 
through screens – you can see and not be harmed.  So it is with 
emanation: by concealing and clothing itself, it reveals itself.160
 
Brilliantly, Cordovero analogizes the unknowability of ein sof to the blinding light of the 
sun: its brightness is so intense that it may as well be complete blackness.  Only once the 
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brightness has been cloaked in the cosmic garment that is keter can it be revealed to 
creation.  Limitless infinity is posited, but the utter inaccessibility of the notion 
evacuates the content of the position.  As such, infinity is negated by its own abstract 
character.  This negation itself becomes (and is the becoming of) determinate, and the 
differentiation of the always already posited negation (keter) from the original abstract 
infinity (ein sof) constitutes contrast: each is negated by the other, and it is only in this 
double movement that the determinate whole of supernal divinity simultaneously 
maintains its infinity and presents (clothes) itself for subsequent emanations and the 
whole of creation.  Hence it is of little if any consequence whether one describes ayin as 
ein sof or as keter: the reciprocity of prime negation allows each to stand for the other.161  
It is for this reason that a sage instructs: 
You may be asked: “How did God bring forth being from 
nothingness?  Is there not an immense difference between being and 
nothingness?”  Answer as follows: “Being is in nothingness in the 
mode of nothingness, and nothingness is in being in the mode of 
being.”  Nothingness is being, and being is nothingness.162
 
This passage presents a succinct (albeit obscure) condensation of the above dialectical 
progression.  In the cosmic ground that “engenders everything that is,”163 being is always 
already the becoming of nothing and nothing the becoming of being.   
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION: COMPREHENSION 
Plotinus addresses the cosmogonical moment of the crisis of transcendence in his 
attempt to bridge primordial infinity to essential nous.  Above, we saw that in his 
treatment of the movement from boundlessness to formation, he employs the notion of a 
mediating act, an act to which he ascribes the double movement of proceeding from the 
One (prohodos) and returning to the source (epistrophē).  He resists, however, the 
assertion that there exists any arche logically prior to Intellect but subordinate to the 
One.  I submit that the maintenance of an unmediated relation of Intellect to the One is 
incompatible with the generative story given by Plotinus.  As such, I offer here an 
interpretation of Plotinean cosmogony which examines the mechanism of mediation as a 
syntactical foundation for Being.   
 Elsewhere, I have presented principles on which the philosophical foundations of 
keter were constructed by classical Kabbalists of the 13th-17th centuries.  Admittedly, any 
textual engagement is itself solely an interpretive exercise.  There is, however, a 
recognizable difference between interpretation bound by an attempt at exegetical validity 
(that is, what the principles meant) and interpretation focused on hermeneutical 
speculation (what the principles mean).  I believe that I have attempted the former above 
(relative both to Plotinus and the Kabbalistic passages), and I intend now to engage the 
latter exercise.  After an interpretation of the outworking of the Plotinean answer to the 
question of transcendence, I purpose to address keter as an outworking similar in aim but 
dramatically divergent in construction.   
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 Both the twofold act of Plotinus – described by prohodos and epistrophē – and 
keter offer bridges across the critical gulf, and insofar as these answers are syntactical, 
they are in the same way soteriological: the mediating act/entity is the prime ordering 
principle for subsequent beings, a principle which itself offers a logic of deliverance, not 
of any one side from itself, but deliverance of the dyad from utter self-diremption.  For 
without some rational link, each side of this moment of the crisis (i.e. both infinite and 
finite) is wholly separate from any other, even from itself for itself.  In this way is the 
gulf made meaningless, but whereas in the bridging of one to other the chasm is engaged 
and overcome in formal, dialectical understanding, utter severance is a pyrrhic triumph: 
by disengaging each side from its opposite, knowledge is emptied of relational content, 
and thus the present side fails even in its understanding of itself for itself.164   
 Finally I will turn to a semiotic analysis of these answers to the question of 
transcendence.  My intention in engaging in such an exercise is to elucidate better the 
linguistic dimensions of keter and prohodos/epistrophē in their relations of infinite to 
finite and vice versa.  An understanding of these lexical elements, I believe, enlivens the 
conception of the metaphysical role of each respective bridge-answer.  This in turn will, 
I hope, clarify both crisis and response relative to the cosmological moment of 
transcendence as conceived by both classical Kabbalists and Plotinus. 
 
Plotinean Syntactical Mechanics 
 Recall that the Plotinean One is the act of production as well as that which 
remains in eternal “repose.”  The latter Plotinus calls the primary activity of the One 
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(energeia tēs ousias); the former is the One’s secondary activity (energeia ek tēs ousias).  
Thus in distinguishing primary from secondary activity I make no distinction not 
introduced by Plotinus himself.  It would seem, however, that one consequence of this 
distinction is the introduction of multiplicity in the notion of the One.  This, I submit, is 
a semantic problem for Plotinus which he attempts to address through talk of proceeding 
(prohodos) and returning (epistrophē).  Based on his comments, I assert that Plotinean 
ontology relative to the generation of Intellect must include more than simply the One as 
absolute unity and nous as finite product.  Far-fetched as this interpretation may seem 
prima facie, I do not think its spirit departs in the least from the Plotinean answer to the 
question of transcendence.  By this I mean that in order to get from the absolute unity of 
the One to the prime formation that is Intellect, mediating bridging acts anticipated and 
described by Plotinus must be asserted as subsisting in themselves, notionally identical 
neither with the One in itself nor Intellect in itself. 
It is, as I mentioned above, correct in Plotinean metaphysics to affirm that 
Intellect is caused by the secondary act of the One.  Thus the secondary act of the One is 
producer just insofar as it is the eternal act of the production of nous.165  Consider that, 
for Plotinus, the generative aspect of the One is its overflow, the procession of infinite 
perfection.  This energeia ek tēs ousias turns back toward the One, and thus is Intellect 
formed:   
In order that Being may exist, the One is not being, but the generator 
of being.  This, we may say, is the first act of generation: the One . . . 
overflows, as it were, and its superabundance makes something other 
than itself.  This, when it has come into being, turns back upon the 
One and is filled, and becomes Intellect by looking towards it.166
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In its perfection, the One “overflows.”  A crucial point of my interpretive 
strategy relative to Plotinean cosmological syntax involves the fact that Plotinus does not 
say, “the One . . . overflows, as it were, and the One makes something other than itself.”  
It is not the primary act of the One which is immediately responsible for the existence of 
Intellect.  Were there no energeia ek tēs ousias of the One, there would be no nous, for it 
is the “superabundance” which “makes something other than itself.”  It seems evident 
from the text that neither the One qua energeia tēs ousias nor nous is identifiable with 
this superabundance.  It is not identifiable with the former insofar as Plotinus himself 
distinguishes between primary and secondary act,167 and it is not identifiable with the 
latter, given this passage’s statement that the creation of the superabundance is “other” 
than the superabundance.   
 Note that, subsequent to the primary act of the One (the One in itself) and prior to 
Intellect’s realization, two elements are recognized: there is the overflow of the 
superabundance – this constitutes the secondary act of the One – and there is the turning 
back of the superabundance toward its source (the primary act of the One).  Plotinus 
compounds the problem of sorting out his ontology by qualifying the act of the overflow 
of superabundance, noting that “when it has come into being” it returns to the source 
from whence it came.  In outlining the earliest stages of Plotinean cosmogony (above), I 
noted the seeming identity of Being with Intellect.   
It seems here that we are presented with two options for interpretation of the 
above selection from V.2.1.  On one hand, it could be that the return is identical to 
Intellect.  This would sort well with the Plotinean interpretation of Parmenides’ dictum, 
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“thinking and being are the same.”  Thus there would be the two acts of the One – such 
distinction within the One is still a problem for Plotinus – and there would be Intellect.  
This interpretation, however, seems inconsistent with Plotinus’ assertion that the return 
(epistrophē)168 “becomes” Intellect.  I cannot make sense of the concept of something 
becoming exactly that which it already is.  For this reason, I reject the first interpretation 
in favor of the second.  Plotinus seems elsewhere to make a similar distinction between 
epistrophē and nous: 
Rather, the intellect must return, so to speak, backwards, and give 
itself up, in a way, to what lies behind it (for it faces both directions); 
and there, if it wishes to see that First Principle, it must not be 
altogether intellect.169
 
 It seems to me that this passage could be taken to support the first interpretation 
of V.2.1 above, but such an argument would likely be based on the assertion that 
Plotinus is calling that which returns “Intellect.”  This is not, I think, a valid argument 
against my interpretation of Plotinean ontology described in V.2.1; rather, it is, I 
propose, an inadequacy in the availability of other terms to Plotinus for description of 
this act of generation.  In many places, Plotinus is forceful in his attempt to limit 
hypostases prior to psyche to two – Intellect and the One.  This is why III.8.9 seems 
mysterious: Plotinus says that “intellect must return,” for what else could he say?  
Certainly the One cannot be said to return to itself; that would imply multiplicity even 
more clearly than does his distinction of energeia tēs ousias from energeia ek tēs ousias 
with respect to the One.  All that remains, ontologically, is Intellect, even though in the 
return, Plotinus admits that “it must not be altogether intellect.”  It is this last statement 
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which perhaps best demonstrates Plotinus’ recognition of a distinction between the 
generative return (epistrophē) and its product (nous).   
 The difference between Intellect and the One (a difference that is, Plotinus holds, 
a product of nous – Intellect differs from the One; the One does not differ) is the chasm 
separating finite from infinite: in the birth of an other – in this case, Intellect – that other 
is, quite necessarily, irretrievably severed from utter unity.  No bridge can erase this 
severance; an answer to the question of transcendence may indeed link one side to the 
other, but the answer does not render the crisis indistinguishable, else to what is it any 
longer an answer?  For Plotinus, the secondary act of the One (the One conceived as 
energeia ek tēs ousias) is severance and return.  How could the One, that which is 
unified beyond limit, be said to be severance?  Does such language not imply that the 
One is the other – that the One is identifiable in some sense with the primary cosmic 
example of “otherness?”  Certainly (and perhaps cardinally), Plotinus is not interested in 
introducing otherness into the notion of the One.  It seems, though, that Plotinus 
nonetheless views otherness as a prerequisite for Intellect’s existence: 
For there could not be thinking without otherness, and also sameness.  
These then are primary, Intellect, Being, Otherness, Sameness; but one 
must also include Motion and Rest.  One must include movement if 
there is thought, and rest that it may think the same; and otherness, 
that there may be thinker and thought or else, if you take away 
otherness, it will become one and keep silent; and the objects of 
thought also, must have otherness in relation to each other.  But one 
must include sameness, because it is one with itself, and all have some 
common unity; and the distinctive quality of each is otherness.170
 
 Notwithstanding his position of an unmediated relation of Intellect to the One, 
there seem to be a number of notions on which Intellect is founded that are not posited 
anywhere in Plotinus of the One in itself.  Plotinus notes Intellect, Being, Motion, Rest, 
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Sameness, and Otherness as “primary.”  He says, however, that “there could not be 
thinking without otherness, and also sameness.”  Given his interpretive endorsement of 
the Parmenidean saying “thinking and being are the same,” one may deduce that for 
Plotinus, there is no Being without Sameness and Otherness.171   
This can be taken in one of three senses:  Sameness and Otherness are logically 
prior to nous, Sameness and Otherness occur logically coextensively with nous, or 
Sameness and Otherness are identical to nous.  The last has been discounted above.  I 
believe we may discount the second, given the asymmetrical dependence relation 
between the elements involved: consider that while Intellect and Being are identifiable 
only through notions of Sameness and Otherness, Sameness and Otherness are 
identifiable regardless of Intellect or Being.  While it could nevertheless be maintained 
that, in spite of this observation, it is logically possible that e.g. Sameness could simply 
occur whenever Intellect occurs and vice versa, I fail to see how such a state of affairs 
would differ from an identity relation.   
I interpret the above passage, therefore, to be asserting the logical subordination 
of Intellect and Being to Sameness and Otherness.  The One is prior to all; that is 
fundamental to Neoplatonic metaphysics.  Otherness and Sameness, therefore, are 
subordinate to absolute unity but prior to Intellect.  At what point do Otherness and 
Sameness begin?  It would seem that the inception of these notions is identifiable at the 
point of overflow: at the diremption of the energeia ek tēs ousias of the One (that is, the 
twofold act described by prohodos and epistrophē) from the energeia tēs ousias, 
Otherness is introduced.  While to say that the One is other than itself would, as noted 
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above, constitute a contradiction in terms, it may be remarked that if the superabundance 
of the One were conceived as ontologically distinct from the One in itself (and I have no 
concept of how else to conceive of it), the positing of a difference relation would be 
logically permissible.  Furthermore, the symmetric relation denied of Intellect and 
Otherness may be affirmed of Otherness and the superabundance: it seems clear enough 
that the superabundance is only identifiable as such by virtue of the notion of Otherness.  
However, whereas above it was evident that Otherness may exist prior to Intellect, it 
may be posited that Otherness cannot exist prior to the superabundance, for prior to the 
superabundance there is only the One, and Otherness in the unity of the One in itself has 
been seen to be an illogical conceptualization.  Seeing no other viable option for the 
introduction of Otherness into Plotinean ontology, I submit therefore that the 
“superabundance” which Plotinus treats as the secondary act of the One is itself the 
beginning of all difference, and thus in the same wise of all similarity. 
 There is another issue to be addressed: the superabundance is identical to primal 
Otherness, but may it be properly said to exist?  That is, is there reason to posit Being of 
the superabundance that is Otherness?  Perl writes, “Being proceeds from, or is produced 
by, the One in that it receives the One as its determination or ‘definer.’”172  This 
statement is correct in its general spirit, but imprecise in its choice of terms.  Strictly, the 
One in itself is not the determination of anything: this implies Being and determinacy 
with respect to the notion of the One as energeia tēs ousias, and as such it is a lexical 
violation in Plotinean treatment.  Note that it is, rather, the superabundance of the One 
that is directly responsible for the fact that nous exists.  This does not say that the One is 
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the definer, but that Intellect is and is defined by virtue of what is, for Plotinus, the 
secondary activity of the One.  The fire does not warm me; I am warm because of the 
fire-heat.  It is not necessary to posit existence of the generative energeia ek tēs ousias; 
indeed, to do so would only serve to push the crisis of transcendence back a step further.  
There seems to me to be no reason to create another interpretive difficulty, given that 
Plotinus is at multiple points adamant in his interpretation of “thinking and being are the 
same.”  Being may still, under the above interpretation, be said to begin with nous. 
 I do not take the eternal act that is the superabundance of the One to be a two-
part act; it is rather a double act which is always already facing progeny and ancestor, so 
to speak.  It cannot be the case that the superabundance proceeds and then returns, if 
“and then” be taken to imply any sort of chronology, for Plotinus does not speak of 
hypostases operating in time until the cosmological descent has reached the level of 
psyche.173  Nonetheless, the vector of prohodos is the opposite of that of epistrophē.  It is 
clear that if the image is to have any meaning, we may reason that while returning 
requires there to have been procession, procession requires, in itself, no return.  
Logically, then, procession would seem to be prior to return.  The question would then 
arise, at what crux would the superabundance turn back to the One?  Ontologically, there 
seems to be no point at which this return should be triggered.  Must we posit some 
irrational metaphysical “point” at which energeia ek tēs ousias returns to its source?  
This physical image, I hold, is a misconception of Plotinus’ view of the secondary act of 
the One. 
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 Plotinus asserts that the superabundance of the One, “when it has come into 
being,” returns.  I take this to mean that, as soon as the superabundance realizes itself for 
itself (that is, as soon as it is other than the One in itself), it is always already the return 
of itself to its source.  Thus that which returns is ontologically indistinguishable from 
that which goes forth.  Prohodos and epistrophē seem to me to be best conceived not as 
a rock thrown up in the air which, when it reaches some calculable point, changes its 
path according to an opposite vector, but as something very like a substance coming into 
consciousness of itself: consider that a consciousness – here, via analogia, the One – 
exists in itself until the moment of self-reflection, at which point consciousness seems in 
a sense to depart from itself and subsist as object, as consciousness for itself.  The 
departure, however, is unrecognizable without the immediate act of self-reflection, by 
which consciousness achieves self-identity in and for itself.  In like manner, the One 
subsists eternally, always already engaged in the self-realizing act of its superabundance 
(energeia ek tēs ousias).  The procession of the secondary act from the primary is only 
recognizable as such on its return.  It is in this sense that our present interpretation takes 
the mediating overflow not as an act of two parts, but as a double, or two-sided, act.   
Note that in the eternity of cosmogonical life, the vector of prohodos is not 
interrupted by epistrophē; rather, it is merely thus compounded.  It “faces both 
directions,” says Plotinus.  Procession and return are two sides of the logical notion by 
which Intellect is formed.  Otherness and Sameness (respectively) are titles of this act – 
each presents one side of the chasm for the other.  The One in itself is subject to no 
relation, so it cannot be said to be related to Intellect.  Gerson contends that “its activity 
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is not in another, because this would imply exactly such a relation.  Its second activity is 
the existence of other things.”174  In its double nature, this act is procession for the One 
(that is Otherness) and returning for Intellect (that is Sameness).   
Thus is the secondary act of itself, as otherness, constitutes the establishment of a 
syntax for determination, form, and being.  It provides the formal ground for semantic 
investment.  This act-as-alterity thus posits the chasm separating the infinite from the 
finite, and in so positing, it bridges it.  Perl’s point that “The answer to the question, 
‘Why does being proceed from the One?” or “How does the One produce being?’ is: the 
One,”175 should be modified such that his answer appreciates both sides of the 
distinguishing act bridging the gulf between limit and boundlessness.  It seems that, 
according to this interpretation, the answer to the first is the vector describable as the 
going-forth of the One from itself for itself: “Why does being proceed from the One?  
Because the secondary act is prohodos.”  The answer to the second is the vector which is 
the outworking of the becoming of nous: 176 “How does the One produce being?  
Because the secondary act is epistrophē.”  In its differentiation from the One in itself, 
primordial superabundance is identifiable with Otherness.  In distinction, formation 
begins. 
 By looking toward the One, Intellect is realized.  In this sense, epistrophē 
constitutes the formation of nous.  Recall Rist’s statement that “Mind is Form” and the 
One is “the maker of Form.”177  This, on the present interpretation, turns out to be an 
oversimplification, but is nonetheless correct in a sense.  Properly, Intellect is not Form, 
but the intellection of Intellect is Form.  Thus, Form forms Mind.  The One is the maker 
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of Form in the following way: the One flows, and this flow, when turning back on the 
One itself, seems to be the forming principle of Intellect.  That is to say that that which 
is, for Plotinus, the energeia ek tēs ousias of the One is identifiable with prime formation 
in this secondary act’s turning in contemplation of the primary.  In so turning, the inner 
life and being of this contemplation is always already Intellect.178   
The One is not itself formed, and the One in itself subsists logically prior to 
Form.  I submit that the superabundance of the One – which is itself, as remarked above, 
Otherness – differentiates and thus forms.  Seemingly, this generative principle, in its 
reflection on its source, becomes nous, and in so doing forms the facets of itself (Forms).  
Intellect is always already born in superabundance’s eternal contemplation of its source 
(energeia tēs ousias) as different from itself (energeia ek tēs ousias).  Though the 
difference comes not from the One in itself, it is present to the One qua forming 
principle.  Primordial overflow, in the cosmogonical fashioning of nous, presents the 
inception of Otherness, as it is the first departure from the inner life of the One.   
 
Kabbalistic Principles Interpreted 
As we have seen above, there is in this Neoplatonic metaphysical philosophy a 
concern with limit, with boundary.  Specifically, there is the realm of objects immanent, 
present to epistemological and lexico-logical mastery.  Contrarily, there is the 
transcendent: it is that which is bound by no linguistic, cognitive, or ontological 
structure.  Form and meaning begin and end at the boundary between the two.  The crisis 
of transcendence is the recognition of this limit, and one instance in the question of 
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transcendence presented itself above in the context of Plotinean cosmology – what is the 
nature of the relation linking nous to the One?  At the moment of connection – linguistic 
connection – with the immanent, the content of the transcendent seems to be annihilated: 
Plotinus attempts a conception of the One as two-sided, but in so doing, I argued, he 
cannot help but introduce multiplicity prior even to nous.  This interpretation seems to 
me to provide a necessary explication of Otherness, for to maintain a two-sided One is to 
concede a violent diremption in which unity in and for itself is destroyed.  Above I 
contended that ultimately, for Plotinus, a double act of procession and return bridges the 
chasm dividing unformed boundlessness and differentiated finitude.   
The sephirot are a Kabbalistic bridge between the mortal world of finitude and 
infinite ein sof.  We have seen that keter is the first emanation of infinite ein sof, from 
which are derived divine wisdom, understanding, knowledge, love, judgment, and 
beauty.  It is crucial to recognize the predicability of all emanations below the first: they 
have been written, and as such, they begin to be infused with the language of the 
immanent.  For instance, one names the second sephira hokhmah because it is wisdom; 
hokhmah says of God that God is wise.  The predication of such an attribute itself limits 
the sephira.  Consider that in calling a thing “wisdom” or “wise,” one is in some sense 
announcing the supremacy or essentiality of a certain predicate of that thing, and in 
announcing the presence of one essential quality, one negatively proclaims the absence 
of another – notwithstanding essential interaction among the ten sephirot, hokhmah is 
wise in a sense in which it is not beautiful, just as tifereth is beautiful as it is not wise.  
This Kabbalistic de-scription of the sephirot is a self-critical struggle – to write them 
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down, but in writing them down, not to write them out of the moment of transcendence.  
As such, there is a maddening ambiguity as to the relation of God to these his vessels: 
are the sephirot God?  If so, they transcend finitude, but in so doing they are 
immediately taken up into ein sof, whose simplicity and unity are unequivocal for 
Kabbalists: God is God, and there are no other Gods before God.  If the sephirot are not 
God, then they can certainly relate to the finite realm, but how then are they any more 
transcendent than e.g. the soul of a man?   
The position of keter is an(other) attempt at balancing infinite and finite, one and 
many, transcendent and immanent.  Above, we witnessed repeated efforts in Kabbalistic 
accounts to shrug off predication relative to keter: it seems that the Kabbalists had got 
some hint of the fact that the light shed by semantic limitation is identical to the gravity 
which pulls the sephirot away from ein sof: these words of description are binding 
threads; they write the sephira down; they write them out, eliminating them as 
superabundant formation eliminates the notion of nous from the One, thrusting 
generative overflow out of the house of limitlessness.  Keter is a diverse principle, acting 
in contrast to the static notions of ein sof and the lower sephirot.  Whereas the latter two 
are, respectively, bound upward in ineffable infinity and bound downward by lexical 
mastery, keter is the Kabbalistic expression of the turning from one to other – keter is 
not itself bound by finitude or infinity, but is always already the hypostatization of the 
turning of the finite toward the infinite and the turning of the infinite to the finite. 
Like prohodos and epistrophē, the subsistence of keter is vectorial: keter is-for.  
This is to say that the nature of keter depends entirely on the perspective from which it is 
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assigned: as we saw above, keter-for-sephirot is concealment in deepest darkness, it is 
primordial.  Keter precedes beginning as an I-know-not-what (precisely because it is an 
I-say-not-what).  From the other side, keter-for-ein sof is luminous revelation.  Keter is a 
topological principle for ein sof, and whereas the lower sephirot succeed only in 
describing God, keter seeks to inscribe God, that is, to write on God in exactly the same 
sense as a garment writes on the wearer.179  Keter is the bridge linking ein sof and 
sephirot, and its eternal act is relative: from each side of the chasm, it hints at the alterity 
of the side beyond and in so doing assigns the other side to that which is present – it 
marks the absent for the present, whether the present be finitude or infinity.   
Keter initializes metaphysical/semantic difference, and this presentation is 
accomplished as/by the eternal act of divine will.  In God’s self-assignment (i.e. the 
inscription on ein sof), keter is itself the syntactical foundation for the beginning of 
words, names, and forms.  I submit that, just as the overflow of the One is itself the 
foundation of Otherness and Sameness, keter is the first differentiation and the first 
unity, the founding for the first not and the first thus together, each with respect to the 
direction of keter’s presentation (toward the finite or the infinite).  According to this 
dialectical definition, keter is the supernally original logos.  Through systematic (i.e. 
systematizing) inclusion and exclusion, keter provides a syntax for the cosmic 
vocabulary present in the lower sephirot.  So it may be said that notions of form, word, 
and name are founded in keter, form-of-forms.   
 Insofar as it is the will that grounds limit, word, and difference, keter negates ein 
sof; one must stands apart from the other.  But insofar as keter turns from the semantic 
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enclosures characterizing the lexically mastered sephirot, keter re-presents ein sof: one 
stands for the other.  Crucially, the first emanation’s linguistic nature is essentially 
trivalent: keter signs/writes some entity to/for another – keter’s identity is a function of 
the present side of the chasm separating one and many, and as such its notion is 
subjective inasmuch as ein sof and the other sephirot are objective/bivalent – each of 
these latter are one-sided for all.180   
The act of bridging immanent finitude and transcendent infinity is not exhausted 
in the first emanation: it should be emphasized that while utter differentiation of unified 
knowability and limitless, concealed infinity is accomplished in the tree of ten sephirot 
as a whole, it is dialectically conceived in the notion of keter, i.e. in the turning of the 
finite toward infinity and vice versa.  For the “classical” Kabbalists, each sephira is 
divine, and the sephirot may flow together in various combinations of divine 
character.181  In predicating of the lower nine, however, the Kabbalists imply the 
fulfillment of the logically prior requirement of the predicability of these sephirot.  The 
fact that “wise” is said (written) in hokhmah indicates its descriptive character.  As we 
have seen, to describe is literally to write down and to write out.  Where keter inscribes 
ein sof (i.e. writes on the indefinite infinite, thereby laying the foundation for syntax), 
the other sephirot describe, laying claim to this logos and investing it with semantic 
relations.  Hokhmah says of God “God is wise;” keter says of God that “God is ____.”   
Obviously the latter statement could not exist without the former, and so it is that 
from the predicable side of the chasm, keter appears just as ein sof: a boundless infinity.  
Without some semantic investment, there is no such thing as a sign, only a sign-vehicle 
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(that is, the graphic possibility of a sign).  Just so, keter-for-sephirot (when excluded 
from the lower nine) is the limitless linguistic potentiality of multitudinous cosmic 
phonemes or serifs, meaning at once everything and nothing, exactly like its progenitor, 
ein sof.   From the other side, however, keter is the laying of a foundation: keter is logos 
for sephirot (and indeed for all creation) in a sense in which ein sof unmistakably is 
not.182
 
Semiotic Relations of Mediating Notions 
 Thus far I have examined and interpreted two answers to a moment in the 
question of transcendence.  The Plotinean answer involves the eternal act of prohodos 
and epistrophē, whereas the Kabbalistic response here examined looks to keter, an 
hypostatized, two-sided subject.  I now mean briefly to set each answer in the context of 
a generic semiotic interpretation and thereby to compare the semantics of each system 
with the other.  This analysis of how each means will, I believe, clarify both responses to 
the crisis.  A semiotic model will serve also to draw out differences between the 
concepts of each. 
 We have supposed a chasm dividing infinite and finite.  Each side refuses to 
concede the crossing thereof: the philosophical schemata examined above both suppose 
that perfect limitlessness is such that it does generate formation in some way, and the 
formed, in order to achieve identity, must look back to the boundless source.  In order 
that it may be identifiable as itself, each side must present a sign of itself such that it is 
distinguished for the other.  Let us begin with present finitude.  Common to the side of 
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the limited, as seen above, is the notion of Form, which is itself undertaken in Otherness.  
This Otherness is not the infinite, and as it is not, it so serves as a sign to the infinite.  
This sign, as act, is the generative overflow in Plotinean cosmogony and is keter-for-ein-
sof as interpreted of Kabbalistic sources – that is, as the syntactical foundation for lower 
emanations.  Thus the sign of the finite is a one-sided conception of the bridge, i.e. the 
inception of determinacy. 
 More perplexing seems to be the question: what sign could the infinite present?  
In sign, formation is presupposed, and this implies multiplicity in that which is, ex 
hypothesi, absolutely unified.  The simplicity of the One/ein sof can only be transgressed 
at the expense of the system itself.  It is a mistake to suppose that the infinite could give 
a sign of itself, because this would suppose a reflexive relation to hold true of the 
limitless One.  Such a relation has been seen to have been denied in both metaphysical 
systems in question; the infinite has been said not relate at all, even to itself.  “Infinite 
itself” is, in fact, inconsistent conceptualization.  The infinite is indistinguishable from 
anything, including Being in its essentiality.  Certainly the finite can give no sign of the 
infinite, for it is its opposite and is presented a sign only in its own otherness.  From this 
observation, however, does a solution arise.  The very bridge which constituted the 
Otherness of finitude is, from the other side, the sign of infinity.  Infinity gives no sign 
of itself, and so it is left to the mediating act/substance to serve as a sign thereof.183   
 The bridge, in Plotinean cosmogony, is presented as a two-place predicate of two 
sides.  It is said that superabundance proceeds from the One in itself (prohodos) and that 
superabundance returns to its source (epistrophē).  Plotinus does not hypostatize this 
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two-way path; for him, it is identifiable as the secondary act of the One (energeia ek tēs 
ousias).  The purpose of the above interpretation was, in large part, an effort to resolve 
the implicit threat of multiplicity in the notion of the One, a threat borne on the language 
of Plotinus himself.  As such, it is important to emphasize that nowhere does Plotinus 
speak explicitly of the superabundance as substance, and clearly it does not, for him, 
constitute an arche like nous or the One.  Prohodos/epistrophē is an act; it is for Plotinus 
the relation of nous to the One as well as (quite problematically) the identification of the 
One with itself.184   
 Let us suppose that by sign I mean the system constituted by a sign-vehicle 
invested with some relation to a thing signified.  As there are two dimensions to the 
Plotinean act that I recognize as Otherness, there are two functions of this act in the 
semiotic relation of Otherness to the One.  I submit that in prohodos, we are presented 
with the inscription of a sign-vehicle.  This inscription is itself the foundation for Form 
and Limit, a ratio-nal principle identifiable in its essential universality.  As yet, this 
essence is only an essence of form, empty of significance.  We have not reached 
language or sign; at this arbitrary point185 prohodos merely determines the scratching on 
which writing is founded.  Some formed thing is thus objectified, and where once186 the 
One in itself resided in an absolute conceptual vacuum, there is now one side of a de-
scription.   
 On the other side of the bi-vectorial act, epistrophē constitutes the investment of 
a sign-vehicle with significance.  In the going-forth, meaning is not yet present.  The 
sign-vehicle is being inscribed.  However, just as (above) we saw that the return of the 
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Plotinean superabundance is to be conceived as occurring identifiably with its 
procession, the inscription of a sign involves the simultaneous formal de-scription of the 
vehicle as well as the semantic investment thereof.  I interpret the Plotinean semiotic 
relation’s logical flow thus: the One resides devoid of position or sign.  As the mediating 
superabundance flows forth, a sign-vehicle is inscribed.  Analogous to the movement of 
self-consciousness,187 however, prohodos in no way precedes epistrophē: in the 
inscription of that which is, in itself, mere sign-vehicle, the opposite investment of 
semantic significance works to create a whole sign.  What, then, is that which is 
signified?  The sign is bi-directional: for the infinite in itself (the Plotinean One qua 
energeia tēs ousias), the sign is the Otherness which signals the formation of nous.  
Here, then, the sign that is Otherness is not that to which it signals (the One), but neither 
is it that for which it signals (Intellect).  For finite Intellect, the sign is a sign of the 
infinity from which it comes and on which it now reflects, receiving thus its own identity 
in and for itself – the sign is a sign of Sameness for nous.   
 The Kabbalistic conception of keter here discussed is like and unlike that of 
Plotinean superabundance.  Both concepts are two-sided, relating finite to infinite and 
vice versa.  I contend that keter is thus a non-static principle, in that it does not resolve 
itself in a single direction, as does ein sof or the lower sephirot.  Whereas prohodos and 
epistrophē may be conceived as a sort of two-sided predicate, keter is best conceived, I 
hold, as subject.  In the Kabbalistic texts examined above, keter seems to have been 
reckoned as a substance, hypostatic in and for itself.  Keter is reckoned as one of the 
sephirot, which may also be described as divine substances possessed of properties.  So 
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it is that for the Kabbalists examined here, the bridge is itself conceived as a subject 
described by its acts rather than as the acts of some other arche.  The semiotic 
outworking of the role of the supreme crown, then, differs intriguingly from that of the 
Plotinean two-way path. 
 Viewed from the side of ein sof, keter constitutes the sign of formation and limit 
that themselves begin with hokhmah.  Keter could therefore be said to be the sign of 
logic, language, and boundary – a rational forming principle for subsequent emanation.  
For ein sof, keter is essential to the constitution of the whole notion of that which ein sof 
is not.  As remarked in the above discussion of ayin, keter is defined for limitless God as 
that which is not limitlessness and is therefore the negation of the everything that is in 
ein sof.188  As such, the signification of keter may be said to be iconic: the Otherness 
signified is apparent in the presentation of keter as primal other.  Such iconography 
collapses, however, for insofar as keter signifies Otherness, since it does so first of all, it 
is itself the Otherness it signifies.  Thus, as a sign of an other, keter is self-signifying.  
As this Otherness, keter is, secondarily, a sign of that which is to begin on keter’s 
foundations: keter signals the advent of the beginning of knowledge and of Being in 
hokhmah.   
 From the other side, keter-for-sephiroth signifies ein sof.  In so doing, it 
transcends all iconography.  Limitlessness cannot be bound by forms of language, but in 
this hypostatic bridge, the ineffable yields itself up to be cloaked in lexical determinacy.  
Thus infinite God is not bounded, but from the side of the finite, the nascent inception of 
boundary signals the unknowable limitlessness which lies beyond.  As a reflective 
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principle, keter is sign-vehicle inscribing onto God,189 but since that which is signified 
cannot be isolated linguistically of itself, the sign-vehicle keter is, when viewed from the 
finite side, indistinguishable from ein sof.  Thus the bridge directed toward infinity does 
not re-present God; keter presents ein sof.  To conceive in semiotic terms is to 
apprehend limits, and infinity is not amenable to such definition.  Keter, to the finite 
side, is ein sof, and so any linguistic attempt to access the signified ein sof terminates 
inevitably in a return to the sign-vehicle, keter.   
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NOTES 
 
1 Notwithstanding the empirical order in which these moments happen to be encountered (i.e. whether e.g. 
Individual against Community is comprehended prior to Being and Non-Being), it is nonetheless true that 
Is/Is not enjoys a logical priority over any of its issues.   
 
2 While it is evident that these two views of Ultimate perfection have been taken up throughout the history 
of thought in the West, it is not evident that the proponents of these views came by their conceptions 
through a process explicitly the same as the arguments explained here.  In introducing them as 
simplistically as I have, I mean only to ground interpretive principles used throughout this essay.  Having 
noted this caveat, however, I do not think it compromises the philosophical validity of present expression.  
 
3 This was observed by Hegel; cf. Phenomenology of Spirit trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), §97ff. 
 
4 Ennead V.5.6.  All citations from the Enneads of Plotinus come from Plotinus, Enneads trans. A. H. 
Armstrong (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966, 1967, 1984). 
 
5 Fr. 8, from G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 248. 
 
6 Ibid, 252ff. 
 
7 He identifies Intellect and Being more directly in his dictum, “thinking and being are the same,” quoted 
by Plotinus at I.4.10, III.8.8, and V.1.8.  As Armstrong notes, an analysis of Plotinus’s position does not 
require certainty of Parmenides’ intended meaning for this puzzling statement. 
 
8 Kirk et al., 252. 
 
9 As we will see, Plotinus affirms the idea that motion is necessary for intellection; therefore he rejects the 
concept of thinking as static.   
 
10 Neoplatonism, (London: Duckworth Ltd., 1972), 56ff. 
 
11 Ennead V.1.5. 
 
12 Wallis, 56. 
 
13 The difference entailment evinces itself in analysis of Parmenides as the riddle of what exists outside of 
Being: if Being has a surface, a limit, there seems (prima facie) to be something that is not Being. 
 
14 Wallis, 48. 
 
15 Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 25. 
 
16 My contention is not that Plotinus consciously embraced an eclectic approach.  It is not clear to me that 
he thought himself to be doing anything other than embracing and expounding on Plato’s philosophy. 
 
17 Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus (New York: Routledge, 1994), 25. 
 
18 Ennead V.1.8. 
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19 Ennead III.8.10. 
 
20 cf. Armstrong, vol. III, 394 n. 1. 
 
21 See below. 
 
22 Wallis, 60. 
 
23 Ennead V.5.6 (italics mine). 
 
24 Ibid 
 
25 Gerson, 15. 
 
26 Regarding the existence of the One, see below. 
 
27 Unformed matter, though not an hypostasis for Plotinus, could be said to complete the fourfold 
distinction as that which does not have but wants.   
 
28 John N. Deck, Nature, Contemplation, and the One: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Lewiston, 
New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), 10-11. 
 
29 Ennead V.4.2. 
 
30 In fact, as has been discussed above,  Plotinus admits the non-intelligibility of the One and even warns 
against approaching it as if it were an intelligible thing (cf. Ennead V.5.6). 
 
31 See below. 
 
32 Plotinus inherits this model of production-as-overflow from the Timaeus, 29e-30c (ed. John M. Cooper 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).  All citations from dialogues of Plato may be found in this volume). 
 
33 Ennead V.4.1. 
 
34 ibid. 
 
35 Deck, 13. 
 
36 Ibid 
 
37 Ennead V.1.6. 
 
38 Ibid 
 
39 See below. 
 
40 ibid.  cf. also Ennead V.4.2. 
 
41 Of course, given the analogous nature of the argument, it is irrelevant whether the sun is actually 
undiminished in its activity of generating light; it is enough that we merely are able to imagine that such 
could be the case. 
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42 Cf. Gerson, 23. 
 
43 Ennead V.4.2. 
 
44 It is my contention that even this distinction between secondary and primary acts of the One falls short 
of finishing the work to be done for Plotinean cosmology; in addition to making a distinction between 
primary and secondary acts, Plotinus must further distinguish the proceeding (prohodos) of the secondary 
act from its return to its source (epistrophē). 
 
45 Cf. John Bussanich, “On the Inner Life of the One,” in Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987), 163-189, here from 
163ff. 
 
46 Ennead III.8.10.  See above note on the Timaeus. 
 
47 Ennead VI.9.3. 
 
48 Cf. Wallis, 60. 
 
49 Gerson, 16. 
 
50 Cf. Eric D. Perl, “‘The Power of All Things’: The One as Pure Giving in Plotinus,” in American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 71 (1997), 301-313, here from 306. 
 
51 Ennead V.4.1. 
 
52 Wallis, op. cit., 57.  The assumption that the perfect is prior to the imperfect is not original to Plotinus.  
Cf. Aristotle, “De Cælo,” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern 
Library, 2001), 269a 19ff.  Where Plotinus departs from Aristotle, as mentioned above, is in his estimation 
of the infinite as more perfect than the finite. 
 
53 Wallis, 60. 
 
54 Gerson, 46. 
 
55 Cf. Deck, 12. 
 
56 See interpretation below. 
 
57 Gerson, 46. 
 
58 Ennead V.5.6. 
 
59 Ibid 
 
60 Cf. Sophist, 244b-245d; see also Parmenides 137c-142a. 
 
61 Ennead V.4.1. 
 
62 Ibid 
 
63 cf. Perl, 305.  I interpret his use of “is not” in the transcendental sense I mentioned above; see below. 
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64 Wallis, 57-58. 
 
65 Gerson, 15. 
 
66 Ibid 
 
67 Perl, 305 n. 19. 
 
68 Ibid, 304. 
 
69 “Plotinus’ Theory of the One,” in The Structure of Being: a Neoplatonic Approach ed. R. Baine Harris 
(Albany: State University of New York, 1982), 40-50, here in 47ff. 
 
70 Ibid, 41. 
 
71 Ennead V.3.14.  cf. Maimonides: “Every attribute  . . . is therefore an attribute of His action and not an 
attribute of His essence . . . .” The Guide of the Perplexed trans. S. Pines (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1963), ch. 53. 
 
72 Rist, 27. 
 
73 Wallis, 68. 
 
74 See below. 
 
75 Logos and Language in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 
1991), 17. 
 
76 Deck, 57. 
 
77 Perl, 303. 
 
78 The meaning of this statement is, I think, valid for at least two senses: 1) Unformed?  Being is not. 2) 
Unformed, Being is not. 
 
79 Ennead III.8.8. 
 
80 Motion and Otherness, I will argue below, constitute the double act of prime formation. 
 
81 Ennead V.1.4. 
 
82 Cf. Perl, 301. 
 
83 Ibid, 308. 
 
84 Ennead V.2.1. 
 
85 Ennead V.1.7. 
 
86 Ennead III.8.9. 
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87 Wallis, 66. 
 
88 Daniel 12:3, NRSV. 
 
89 Zohar I 15a-15b (All Zoharic selections here have been taken from Isaiah Tishby, ed., The Wisdom of 
the Zohar trans. David Goldstein (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).). 
 
90 Isaac ibn Latif, quoted in Gershom Scholem, Kabbalah (New York: Meridian, 1978), 93. 
 
91 Asher b. David (1200’s), quoted in Ephraim Gottlieb, Ha-Qabbalah be-Khitevei Babbenu Bahya ben 
Asher (Jerusalem: Kiryath Sepher, 1970), 84, trans. and quoted in Daniel C. Matt, The Essential 
Kabbalah: The Heart of Jewish Mysticism (San Francisco: Harper, 1996), 66. 
 
92 And, as is equally applicable, “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.” 
(Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ed. C. K. Ogden (New York: Routledge, 1990), 
§7. 
 
93 The subsequent discussion is supplemented scripturally at numerous points throughout the Zohar, 
notably II:239a, I:22b, II:42b-43a, I:15a-15b, I:18a, and I:50b-51b.  It is best supplemented in 
contemporary sources in Scholem, op. cit., 88-105, 128-144 & passim. 
 
94 The Sepher Yetsira, ed. and trans. Carlo Suares (Boulder: Shambhala, 1976), 70-71. 
 
95 Gershom Scholem, Origins of the Kabbalah ed. R. J. Zwi Werblowsky, trans. Allan Arkush (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), 35-53. 
 
96 Scholem, Origins, 25. 
 
97 Seppir is etymologically related to “sapphire” rather than to “sphere.”  Cf. Scholem, Kabbalah, 99. 
 
98 In a clearly Platonic move, this emanation is said to precede the creation of the physical universe.  
Regarding views on other pre-existing emanations, see Scholem, Kabbalah, 116ff. 
 
99 Cf. Scholem, Kabbalah, 88 & passim. 
 
100 Scholem, Origins, 114. 
 
101 Scholem, Kabbalah, 100.  Cf. also Tishby, 269. 
 
102 Ibid, 90. 
 
103 Ibid, 92. 
 
104 Ibid, 106-107. 
 
105 Tishby, 269-270.  See interpretation, below. 
 
106 Ibid, 271.  See Zohar I:15a-15b.  I attempt a deeper treatment of the issue of blackness/whiteness and 
the semantics of divine light below. 
 
107 Scholem, Kabbalah, 106-107.  See Zohar III:135a-135b, 289b-290a. 
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108 II:239a. 
 
109 Or Ne’erav, ed. Yehuda Z. Brandwein, in Matt, 41. 
 
110 Scholem, Kabbalah, 106ff. 
 
111 cf. Tishby, 269-270. 
 
112 Scholem, Kabbalah, 107 & passim. 
 
113 Scholem, Kabbalah, 91-93; cf. also Tishby, 270.  I discuss the concept of keter as the will of God more 
fully below.   
 
114 III:275b-285a.   
 
115 cf. Tikkunei ha-Zohar, 17a-17b in Matt, 50-51.  Also cf. Tishby, 259-260. 
 
116 It is exactly this sense that accounts for much of the connotation of keter as ayin.  See below. 
 
117 Cordovero, Or Ne’erav, in Matt, 41. 
 
118 It may be noted that Cordovero explicitly opposes this point in Or Ne’erav, but it is also the case that 
he grants that when keter is taken as da’at (knowledge), it acts just as would any other sephira (see Matt, 
40).  As I stated above, I am allowing for the externalization of keter-as-da’at to be covered under the 
general title keter.   
 
119 Scholem, Kabbalah, 100. 
 
120 I:15a-15b. 
 
121 I:246b. 
 
122 Scholem, Kabbalah, 99. 
 
123 Ayin here represents keter.  See Tishby, 326, n. 186. 
 
124 Zohar II:200a. 
 
125 Scholem, Kabbalah, 88. 
 
126 Cf. Cordovero, Or Ne’erav, in Matt, 40. 
 
127 See below. 
 
128 Cordovero, Or Ne’erav, in Matt, 47. 
 
129 Hayyim Vital, “On the World of Emanation” (16th cent.) in Matt, op. cit., 95. 
 
130 Cordovero, Or Ne’erav, in Matt, 46. 
 
131 Moses Nahmanides (13th cent.), Commentary on Sefer Yetsirah ed. Scholem (1929) in Matt, 93.   
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132 Scholem, Kabbalah, 88. 
 
133 Note, however, that this does not divest keter of its status as the originator of the foundations for 
naming, voice, and reason (see above).  Cf. Tishby, 334 n. 265. 
 
134 Cf. Zohar I:16b-17a, Scholem, op. cit., 103, and Tishby, 265 n. 3, respectively.  
 
135 For a robust account of this, cf. Tishby, 242-246. 
 
136 I:3b-4a. 
 
137 Cf. Scholem, Kabbalah, 90. 
 
138 Or Ne’erav, in Matt, 40. 
 
139 Cf. Scholem, op. cit., 146 & passim. 
 
140 Scholem, Kabbalah, 91-93. 
 
141 See above note. 
 
142 Scholem, Kabbalah, 92. 
 
143 Tishby, 242. 
 
144 Tomer Devorah, in Matt, 84-85. 
 
145 This accounts for its white color.  See below. 
 
146 I:65a. 
 
147 cf. Tishby, 324 n. 157. 
 
148 III:290a. 
 
149 From Ibn Gabriol in Scholem, op. cit., 93. 
 
150 Ibid, 94. 
 
151 Sha’arei Orah in Matt, 67. 
 
152 Cf. Scholem, Kabbalah, 89.  The same concept applies to ein sof, given its similarly unknowable 
character.  I discuss the conflation of ein sof and keter as ayin below. 
 
153 Cf. Zohar III:135a-135b & passim., in which keter is called the “white head.” 
 
154 Cordovero, Or Ne’erav, in Matt, 47. 
 
155 Scholem, Kabbalah, 109. 
 
156 Ibid, 91. 
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157 Scholem, Kabbalah, 129ff. 
 
158 III:225a. 
 
159 III:135b. 
 
160 Pardes Rimmonim, in Matt, 91. 
 
161 Cf. Scholem, Kabbalah, 94, also 147. 
 
162 Azriel of Gerona, Derekh ha-Emunah ve-Derekh ha Kefirah in Matt, 68. 
 
163 Moses de León (13th century), Sheqel ha-Qodesh in Matt, 69. 
 
164 Cf. Hegel, §96-97, also §111. 
 
165 Cf. Perl, 306-307. 
 
166 Ennead V.2.1. 
 
167 Cf. Ennead V.4.2 & above comments thereon. 
 
168 Cf. Wallis, 66. 
 
169 Ennead III.8.9. 
 
170 Ennead V.1.4. 
 
171 Cf. Parmenides 142b-157a. 
 
172 Perl, 304. 
 
173 Cf. Ennead III.7.10. 
 
174 Gerson, 34 [italics mine]. 
 
175 Perl, 309. 
 
176 Cf. Ennead V.2.1 above; the return “becomes intellect by looking toward it [the One].” 
 
177 Rist, 27. 
 
178 Cf. Ennead III.8.8. 
 
179 Scholem, Kabbalah, 104. 
 
180 This reads as follows: ein sof presents infinity; sephirot present unified natures. 
 
181 Scholem, Kabbalah, 107ff. 
 
182 Cf. my comments on the relativity of cosmological nothingness (ayin), above. 
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183 Cf. Scholem, Kabbalah, 104.  See below my interpretation of keter as a sign of ein sof. 
 
184 See above. 
 
185 I am not here contradicting my above contention regarding the simultaneity of prohodos and epistrophē 
(see below); this “point” is arbitrary and present only in this abstraction.  When the act is comprehended as 
a unified whole, the point is laid bare in its emptiness and so it is reduced to nothing. 
 
186 Although I will utilize time-language such as “now,” “once,” and “yet” in reference to the semiotic 
relationships here in question, I do not mean to suggest a chronology of events so much as I do a logical 
sequence of argument. 
 
187 See above. 
 
188 This dialectical movement seems remarkably similar to Hegel’s treatment of the definition of the object 
via negation (Hegel, §96). 
 
189 See above interpretation. 
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